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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkin pro gradu -tutkielmassani yrityksen hallintoelinten vastuuvakuutuksen vaikutusta 
yrityskauppojen ympärillä esiintyviin kumulatiivisiin epänormaaleihin osaketuottoihin. 
Tutkimukseni ensimmäinen tavoite on toistaa aiemmin saavutetut tulokset vastuuvakuutuksen 
vakuutusmäärän ja yrityskauppojen tuottojen välillä käyttäen kanadalaisia yrityksiä. Sen jälkeen 
selvitän, vaikuttaako yrityksen listautuminen yhdysvaltalaiseen osakepörssiin tuloksiin. 
Tutkimukseni toinen tavoite on kokeilla voiko yrityksen maksamaa hallintoelinten 
vastuuvakuutuksen hintaa käyttää mittarina yhtiön hallinnoinnin laadukkuudelle ja verrata sen 
selitysvoimaa yrityskauppojen tuotoille kahteen hallinnoinnin laadukkuutta mittaavaan indeksiin. 
DATA JA METODOLOGIA 
Otokseni koostuu 2.238 yrityskaupasta, jotka on tehty vuosien 2003 ja 2013 välillä. Näistä kaupoista 
1.602 kappaletta on ainoastaan Kanadassa listattujen yritysten tekemiä ja 636 kauppaa sellaisten 
yritysten tekemiä, jotka on listattu pörssiin myös Yhdysvalloissa. Sekä vakuutus- että hallinnointi-
indeksidata on käsin kerättyä ja siksi ainutlaatuista. Analyysini perustuu yhden ja usean muuttujan 
regressioon (pienimmän neliösumman menetelmä, PNS). Regressioissa selitettävinä muuttujina ovat 
yrityskaupan julkaisun ympärille lasketut viiden päivän epänormaalit kumulatiiviset osaketuotot sekä 
yrityskaupan preemio. Selittävinä muuttujina ovat vakuutuksen esiintyminen, vakuutusmäärä ja -
preemio sekä kaksi hallinnointi-indeksiä. Kontrolleina ovat kauppa- ja yrityskohtaisia muuttujia sekä 
kiinteinä vaikutuksina kaupantekovuosi ja yrityksen toimiala. 
TULOKSET 
Vain Kanadassa listatut yritykset kokevat negatiivisia osaketuottoja yrityskaupan ympärillä, kun 
niiden hallintoelinten vastuuvakuutusmäärä kasvaa. Tulos on linjassa aiemmin aiheesta tehtyjen 
tutkimusten kanssa. Toisaalta yritykset, jotka ovat listattu pörssiin myös Yhdysvalloissa, kokevat 
positiivisia tuottoja niiden vastuuvakuutusmäärän kasvaessa. Lisäksi vastuuvakuutuksen hinta 
korreloi negatiivisesti osaketuottojen kanssa, mutta vertailuindeksien ja tuottojen välistä korrelaatiota 
ei ole. Tämä viittaa siihen, että vakuutusyhtiöt kykenevät hinnoittelemaan hallinnointirakenteiden 
riskit siten, että hinta sisältää ainutlaatuista tietoa yrityksen hallinnointirakenteista, jota ei muuten ole 
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1. Introduction 
“What you’re really underwriting when you underwrite D&O is you’re underwriting 
the people. You’re underwriting the senior management, the quality of the 
management team.” ― D&O broker, Baker and Griffith (2007) 
Directors and officers are responsible for the firm’s actions with their personal assets in the event of 
a lawsuit against the firm and its management. They can protect themselves from these liabilities by 
having the corporation to purchase a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (hereafter referred to 
as D&O insurance). Many studies have found evidence that the protection provided by the D&O 
insurance can affect the management’s decisions and thus the D&O insurance information can be 
valuable in evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance structures and maximizing returns 
to outside shareholders. Furthermore, D&O insurers go deep in the governance structures of their 
clients in the underwriting process, and recent studies have found evidence that the pricing of the 
firm’s D&O insurance can include information on the quality of governance structures that is not 
otherwise publicly available. As stated in the quote above, D&O insurance underwriting is a process 
of evaluating the quality of the firm management.  
The relationship between stockholders and management is the basic example of the traditional 
principal-agent relationship. As it is always the case with a principal-agent relationship, it is not 
possible to completely eliminate the conflict of interest between directors and stockholders. The 
director is acting as the agent for the shareholders and is supposed to make decisions that will 
maximize shareholder wealth. However, it is in the director's own best interest to maximize his own 
wealth. D&O insurance decision can affect the shareholder-director relationship by motivating the 
director to act either more or less in the best interest of stockholders. Whether the D&O insurance is 
beneficial for the stockholders or not is an empirical question.  
D&O insurance information is publicly available only in a few countries in the world and most of the 
D&O insurance studies are conducted with Canadian, Taiwanese or British data. As Kang and 
Klausner (2011) point out, the legal environment is very litigious in the US and there has been recently 
loss of confidence in corporate governance resulting from the debacle of corporates like Enron, 
Worldcom, Adelphia, and Anderson. Today directors are facing even greater risk of lawsuits 
originating from shareholders. Therefore, D&O insurance can be especially important for directors 
of firms operating in the US market. However, firms are not required to publish their D&O insurance 
data in the US and thus the effects of D&O insurance on US firms are still not well known. 
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In this thesis, I shed light on the effect of D&O insurance in US market by using a sample of US 
cross-listed firms. I study D&O insurance coverage and D&O insurance premium and test their 
relevance on explaining acquirer returns. I look for any correlation between these two D&O insurance 
variables and cumulative abnormal announcement returns. With D&O insurance coverage I make 
comparison between firms which are listed only in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) to those which 
are also cross-listed in one of the stock markets in the US (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq). Dividing my 
sample into cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms gives an opportunity to see the effects of the D&O 
insurance decision for the firms participating in the US market. Furthermore, with the sample of cross-
listed firms, I use D&O insurance premium and two most commonly used Canadian corporate 
governance indexes as proxies for the quality of corporate governance and test their ability to explain 
acquirer returns. 
1.1 Contribution to existing research 
There has been recently a growing consensus in D&O insurance research. However, data used in most 
of the studies are limited to countries where firms are required to publish their D&O insurance 
information. Therefore, there are still many interesting market areas, especially the US, where the 
effects of D&O insurance are still not well known. By taking the same approach as Kang and Klausner 
(2011) in their study of D&O insurance and CEO overcompensation, I am using Canadian firms 
cross-listed in the US to get comparable results to US firms. To the best of my knowledge, using 
cross-listed firms is by far the most accurate way to study D&O insurance in the US market at the 
moment. 
Thanks to the cross-listing approach, my thesis adds to the current research in several ways. It is by 
far the first paper to research the effects of D&O insurance coverage on acquirer returns with a sample 
that differentiates firms listed in the US. It is also the first paper to test successfully D&O insurance 
premium as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance and to make comparison between D&O 
insurance premium and corporate governance indexes in an acquisition event. 
In addition to filling the existing research gap on the effects of D&O insurance, my research also has 
practical significance to legislators, outside investors, and firm management and owners. It supports 
the idea that legislators should require firms to disclose their D&O insurance information in countries 
where this piece of information is not yet publicly available, as it can be valuable for outside investors 
in evaluating the effectiveness of firm’s governance structures. This study provides firm management 
and owners support for their optimal D&O insurance decision. 
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1.2 Key research questions 
My study can be divided into two high-level categories. First, I study the relation between D&O 
insurance variables and acquirer returns, including the decision to purchase the insurance and the 
amount of coverage purchased. I also take a look at differences in M&A activity between different 
kinds of firms. I split the sample firms into two groups, the first one covering firms which are listed 
only in Canada (non-cross-listed firms), and the other covering firms which are cross-listed in the US 
(cross-listed firms). This leads to my first three research questions: 
I. Research question: Is there a difference in the amount of D&O insurance coverage 
between firms listed only in Canada and firms cross-listed in the US? 
II. Research question: Is there a difference in M&A activity of firms with low and high D&O 
insurance coverage between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms? 
III. Research question: Is there a difference in the impact of D&O insurance coverage on 
acquirer returns between non-cross-listed firms and firms cross-listed in the US? 
The second high-level category of my study focuses on the D&O insurance premium and acquirer 
returns using the cross-listed sample. I develop a proxy from the D&O insurance premium for the 
quality of corporate governance and study its relation with acquirer returns. As a comparison I run 
the same regressions for two corporate governance indexes and see which one has the strongest 
explanatory power of acquirer returns. 
IV. Research question: Can D&O insurance premium explain acquirer returns and thus be 
used as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance? 
V. Research question: Which one of the variables, D&O insurance premium or the two 
governance indexes, has the strongest explanatory power of acquirer returns? 
1.3 Findings of the study 
My data set reveals differences between firms and their D&O insurance decisions based on their 
cross-listing status. Cross-listed firms are on average larger, they are more likely to purchase D&O 
insurance, and they purchase higher levels of D&O insurance coverage than firms that are non-cross-
listed. In my sample 83.5% of cross-listed firms and 67% of non-cross-listed firms carry a D&O 
insurance policy. The average coverage for a cross-listed firm is C$84.8M and the average coverage 
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for a non-cross-listed firm is C$18.1M. However, in relation to firm size, non-cross-listed firms carry 
higher D&O insurance coverage ratios than cross-listed ones.  
The first key finding of my study is that firms listed only in Canada experience significantly lower 
acquirer abnormal returns when they carry higher levels of D&O insurance coverage. The negative 
relation is in line with the prior literature. However, the relation becomes significantly positive when 
firms are cross-listed in the US. In the cross-listed group a one-standard-deviation higher insurance 
coverage ratio increases acquirer abnormal announcement returns by 1.4% and in the non-cross-listed 
group it decreases them by -0.7%. The positive relation between D&O insurance coverage and 
acquirer returns in the cross-listed group holds after controlling for deal and acquirer characteristics, 
deal types based on target and financing status, and year and industry fixed-effects. Furthermore, the 
results are robust after addressing the possible endogeneity problem by using an instrumental variable 
approach. The indirect evidence of this study suggests that cross-listed firms with low D&O insurance 
coverage make relatively fewer acquisitions than non-cross-listed firms with low coverage. Reduced 
M&A activity among cross-listed firms with low coverage can be an indication of an underinvestment 
problem. 
The second key finding of my study is the significant negative relation between D&O insurance 
premium and acquirer returns, indicating that insurance companies can price the risk related to 
corporate governance structures of a firm. More specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
natural logarithmic transformation of per dollar D&O insurance premium reduces acquirer abnormal 
announcement returns by 0.9%. The negative relation between premium and acquirer returns holds 
after controlling for deal and acquirer characteristics, deal types based on target and financing status, 
and year fixed-effects. Furthermore, the results are robust after sensitivity testing by a dummy 
variable approach. My results also suggest that there is no significant relation between either of the 
two corporate governance indexes and acquirer returns. My results support the idea that D&O 
insurance premium includes valuable information not otherwise available in the market. 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
As it is with all the D&O insurance studies, the availability of insurance data is always a concern. 
Therefore, to get an idea of US firms the study has to be made with Canadian firms that are cross-
listed in the US. It is possible that these cross-listed Canadian firms have some meaningful differences 
to US firms that cannot be taken into account in this study. One possible difference is in the industry 
structures of the two countries. For example, in Canada large mining companies account for much 
larger share of the total market than in the US. I address the industry composition issue by using 
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industry fixed-effects, which should at least reduce the effect of the differences in industry structures. 
Also, the number of sample firms available for the study is quite limited as they have to be cross-
listed and publish their D&O insurance information in enough detail. 
The other limitation of this study is in the data collecting. D&O insurance and corporate governance 
indexes data have to be hand-collected. As my sample includes only firms that have made 
acquisitions, comparing M&A activity between firms with different levels of protection can provide 
only indirect evidence on their acquisition decisions. There are some control variables that could be 
meaningful, but they would also require hand-collecting and are thus out of scope of this study. For 
example, including CEO experience and board characteristics could improve the explanatory power 
of my model. There are also some control variables that could be meaningful, such as relative deal 
size, but they would reduce the sample size considerably and therefore they have to be omitted from 
the regression model. The level of detail in the disclosure of D&O insurance information is at times 
relatively poor. Some firms report having the insurance on their proxy circulars, but they do not 
provide any other necessary information for this study. 
1.5 Structure of the study  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of D&O insurance, corporate 
governance, cross-listing, and existing literature by discussing both the existing research on the topic 
and the D&O insurance and corporate governance on a more general level. Chapter 3 introduces my 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 covers data and sample selection used in this study. Chapter 5 introduces 
methods and the construction of variables. Chapter 6 presents the empirical results of my analysis. In 
chapter 7 I discuss my results and link them to my research questions. In chapter 8 I conclude the key 
results and suggest areas for future research.   
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2. Literature review 
This section provides an overview on the existing literature. First, I discuss the D&O insurance in 
general and reasons why firms purchase the insurance. Next, I discuss what the current literature finds 
about D&O insurance coverage, D&O insurance premium, and cross-listing of a firm. Then I explain 
the relation between D&O insurance and corporate governance, and go through the meaning of D&O 
insurance in corporate governance studies. Finally, I bring up some problems with the current 
corporate governance research and corporate governance indexes. 
2.1 D&O insurance in general 
Directors can be sued under the corporate law for breach of acting honestly and in good faith or duty 
of care. They can be sued under the securities law, which is according to Donley and Kent (2008) the 
most significant source of risk for the directors. Both D&O insurance and corporate indemnification 
provide protection to directors and officers for legal liability arising from their professional activities 
on behalf of the firm. Indemnification is a process in which firms agree to compensate executives for 
the costs of defense and or settling lawsuits brought against them personally as a result of their actions 
in the management. Firms purchase D&O insurance to recoup these indemnification costs, or to 
provide protection when indemnification does not apply. According to Lin, Officer and Zou (2011), 
most securities class action lawsuits in the US brought by shareholders are settled out of the court 
within the D&O insurance coverage limit. Therefore, for a firm D&O insurance is an important source 
of protection for the defense and settlement of lawsuits. 
In the US the importance of D&O insurance has been increasing in recent years. Surveys conducted 
by consulting firm Tillinghast-Towers and Perrin (2002, and 2012) highlight the change: In 2002, 
19% of firms in the US had at least one lawsuit brought against their directors in the previous ten 
years, but their similar study in 2012 reports the share had increased to 36%. The increase in lawsuits 
indicates that D&O insurance claim activity is increasing and it has become a public company 
phenomenon. The study in 2012 also states that most of the claims against directors and officers are 
brought from direct shareholders (46%), derivative shareholders (40%) and employees (30%). 
Regulatory actions have increased their share of claims since new laws put in place due to the 
financial crisis, including Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. They 
accounted for 23% of all claims in 2012 as in comparison it was 16% in 2010. Furthermore, inquiries 
in the US made by directors about the amount and scope of coverage, has become more common due 
to the growing number of claims made against them. According to the survey made by Tillinghast-
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Towers and Perrin (2012), firms have reacted to the growing number of claims by increasing their 
total insurance coverages at D&O program renewals. The whole marketplace for the insurance has 
been put into a state of transition, as evidenced by higher pricing experienced in many sectors. 
According to Lin, Officer, Wang and Zou (2013), the Canadian system for handling securities class 
action lawsuits is similar to that in the US to a large extent. They point out that the liability risk to 
corporate directors and officers often comes from shareholder litigation or lawsuits brought by other 
parties such as creditors and regulators. According to Chalmers, Dann and Harford (2002), directors 
and officers consider D&O insurance to be crucial in Canada as it is in the US. For example, in 
Canada the costs of settlement or judgment in derivative suits are typically covered by a D&O 
insurance policy. However, there are some important differences between the governance systems in 
Canada and the US that can have an effect on whether D&O insurance protection is beneficial for the 
corporate shareholders or not. According to Gouiaa and Zéghal (2013), Canadian firms operate within 
a socio-economic environment which has many distinguishing features that can influence both the 
governance practices and the financing costs. In Canada firms use a specific governance system which 
includes strong legal and extra-legal institutions aimed at protecting investors. It is characterized by 
a principle-based governance approach.  
2.2 Reasons why firms purchase D&O insurance 
According to O’Sullivan (2002), firms purchase D&O insurance for three main reasons: (1) as a part 
of their corporate insurance program, (2) due to demand from directors, and (3) as part of an optimal 
governance arrangement:  
First, for many firms D&O liability insurance is an important part of their insurance program. It 
covers the firm itself from the costs of lawsuit settlements caused by the actions of the management. 
Hazen and Hazen (2012) point out that the criticality of D&O insurance can be assessed from the fact 
that directors of even not-for-profit firms are advised to act in the same manner as directors of firms 
when D&O insurance is not available. 
Second, directors are representative of the corporation and they can be personally liable for some of 
their actions committed in the name of the corporation. Therefore, the existence of the D&O insurance 
can be, according to Boyer and Delvaux-Derome (2002), a notable factor when they are deciding 
whether to join the firm or not. Romano (1989) points out directors are known to resign or not to 
come aboard in for-profit firms in absence of D&O insurance.  
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Third, according to Chi, Weng, Gong and Chen (2013), firms have established internal corporate 
governance mechanisms to encourage CEO risk taking behavior by providing D&O insurance and by 
awarding CEOs equity incentives. D&O insurance works also as a corporate governance mechanism 
due to monitoring and inspection done by the insurer. As the insurance allows executives to face 
lower litigation risk, it can allow them to take appropriate risks to maximize shareholder value. 
However, D&O liability insurance can also entrench directors because of the protection it provides 
them against shareholder lawsuits. Therefore, the effect of D&O insurance on shareholder wealth is 
an empirical question. 
There are many firm specific factors that affect the decision whether to buy the D&O insurance or 
not. According to Boyer and Delvaux-Derome (2002), firms that are larger, have higher stock 
volatility, are more exposed to US litigation, exhibit lower levels of directorial ownership, and possess 
greater non-executive representation on their boards are more likely to purchase the insurance. Core 
(1997) also points out that a firm with greater inside voting control is more likely to purchase D&O 
liability insurance and carry higher limits. On the other hand, Boyer and Delvaux-Derome (2002) 
state that firms that are strong financially, have many outsiders on the board of directors or their board 
member have an important financial stake in the firm are less likely to purchase the insurance. 
2.3 Main findings in prior literature on D&O insurance 
In recent years, D&O insurance has become a more common part of insurance packages due to the 
tightened legal environment after many company scandals and the financial crisis. Now the actions 
of firm management are even more under the scope than before. Therefore, there is a growing 
consensus in D&O insurance research as well. These studies have found evidence that D&O insurance 
affects management behavior and that there is a relation between D&O insurance variables and the 
quality of governance structures. 
Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis argues that directors realize large personal gains from 
empire building. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) identify that several types of acquisitions, such 
as diversifying acquisitions and acquisitions of high growth targets, can yield substantial benefits to 
directors, while at the same time hurting shareholders. The level of D&O insurance protection can 
affect the incentives of the management team to make these decisions hurting shareholders. However, 
the effects vary between different studies. Some of the studies report that extensive D&O insurance 
protection leads to higher risk taking and more diversifying acquisitions due to the empire building 
behavior. For example, according to Lin et al. (2013), there is a positive relation between both 
idiosyncratic and total risk of a firm and the D&O insurance coverage in Canada. They suggest that 
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lenders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk associated with greater risk taking 
and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. Furthermore, 
Lin et al. (2011) find that D&O insurance coverage has negative relation with acquirer returns in 
Canada.  
On the other hand, there are also studies suggesting that extensive D&O insurance protection makes 
shareholders better off. For example, Kalelkar and Nwaeze (2015) find that firms in the US with 
abnormal D&O insurance protection are positively associated with aggressive reporting, aggressive 
investment activity, and abnormal profit performance. However, their study is based on voluntary 
disclosures of D&O insurance information, which do not have standard format and reduces the sample 
size. Whether higher D&O insurance protection is beneficial for shareholders in the US market is still 
an empirical question. 
According to Core (2000), there is a growing consensus inside and outside academics that weak 
corporate governance is costly to outside shareholders. They also state that it is difficult and costly 
for shareholders to assess its quality. There are studies suggesting that D&O insurance premium can 
be used as a proxy for evaluating governance structures. For example, Baker and Griffith (2007) 
report that insurers seek to price D&O policies according to the risk posed by each prospective insured 
and that underwriters focus on corporate governance in assessing risk. According to them, in addition 
to performing a basic financial analysis of the firm, underwriters focus a large part of their efforts on 
deep governance variables such as culture and character, rather than the formal governance structures 
that are typically studied.  
Core (2000) states it is too costly for the insurer to just exclude all claims arising from weak corporate 
governance. Since the quality of governance structures varies in cross section for otherwise identical 
firms, the insurer prices the quality of corporate governance in D&O premiums. A firm with weaker 
governance has greater litigation risk because the management of such a firm is more likely to act 
inconsistent with shareholders’ interests. Core shows a detectable variation in D&O premium that is 
related to variables which proxy for the quality of firms’ governance. Both Core (2000) and Kang 
and Klausner (2011), show that the proxies for weak governance are positively associated with excess 
CEO compensation. Their results provide evidence that D&O insurers charge firms higher premiums 
when they adopt governance structures that make shareholders worse off. To the best of my 
knowledge, the empirical question of the possible relation between D&O insurance premiums and 
acquirer returns has not yet been tested. 
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2.4 Cross-listing in the US 
Exposure to the more litigious US legal environment has been found to be a significant determinant 
of the D&O premium (see Core, 2000). Adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements in 2002 made 
cross-listing in US exchanges more expensive than it was in the past and the new requirements put a 
heavy emphasis on corporate governance and accountability. As cross-listing can have various effects 
on corporate governance structures, I take firms’ cross-listing in the US into account in this study. 
Cross-listing can have an effect on the firm’s D&O insurance purchase decision and management 
behavior, and also on the pricing of the D&O insurance. For example, Burns, Francis, and Hasan 
(2007) find that compared to firms based in the US, cross-listed firms are less likely to use equity in 
takeovers of US targets. They also find that cross-listing reduces barriers to investment. Furthermore, 
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) find that firms that are cross-listed in US exchanges have greater analyst 
coverage and increased forecast accuracy than firms that are non-cross-listed. They also show that 
cross-listed firms have higher valuations. They state that the change in firm value around cross listing 
is correlated with changes in analyst following and forecast accuracy, suggesting that cross listing 
enhances firm value through its effect on the firm's information environment. Their findings support 
the hypothesis that cross-listed firms have better information environments that are associated with 
higher market valuations. 
In theory, it is possible that the stock prices of cross-listed firms could differ between the stock 
exchanges, which could have an effect on this study. However, Eun, and Sabherwal (2003) find that 
prices in the TSX and US exchange are cointegrated and mutually adjusting for firms listed in both 
countries.  They state that the US share is directly related to the US share of trading and to the ratio 
of proportions of informative trades on the US exchange and the TSX, and inversely related to the 
ratio of bid-ask spreads. 
2.5 Theoretical framework of corporate governance 
The theoretical framework of corporate governance is based on the finance literature of the late 1970s 
and the legal literature of the 1980s. In 1976, Jensen and Meckling developed a theory of agency 
costs in the public firm, which remains the dominant framework of analysis for corporate governance 
today. A contractarian view of corporation emerged, in which corporation was viewed as a nexus of 
contracts among constituents, including directors, shareholders, creditors, employees, and others. 
Since then, the focus of governance has primarily been on the agency relationship between directors 
and shareholders. In corporate governance the contractual shareholder-director relationship means 
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that market forces lead the parties to create governance arrangements and adopt legal rules that would 
minimize agency costs and thereby maximize firm value. In the literature, contractual governance is 
seen as superior to legally imposed governance arrangements because firms are different along 
numerous dimensions and market forces create incentives to customize and to innovate. 
However, Klausner (2013) states that the contractarian theory failed to take into account important 
institutional facts. He states that the empirical literature provides the facts needed to reassess the 
contractarian theory and the understanding of corporate governance in general. Also, Gillan (2006) 
points out that traditional empirical research of corporate governance is increasingly under attack 
from critiques of endogeneity. There have been calls from many researchers including Coles, 
Lemmon and Meschke (2012), and Zingales (2000) amongst others, to further develop structural 
models or quantitative theories of the firm to improve the empirical work. Klausner suggests that the 
study of empirical regularities and associations combined with traditional theoretical modelling and 
the development of structural models will pave the way forward. He states that careful modeling of 
transactional event, such as mergers and acquisitions, and how they relate to governance 
characteristics will continue to be a stable of governance research. Therefore, as D&O insurance can 
include additional information on firm’s governance structures, it can provide a new angle for 
corporate governance studies.  
2.6 Benchmark for D&O insurance premium: Governance indexes 
To get a better idea how well D&O insurance premium can explain corporate governance quality, it 
needs a benchmark to make a comparison. In the literature, corporate governance indexes are 
typically used to evaluate the quality of corporate governance. Therefore, they are a relevant choice 
for the benchmark.  
Some researchers (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk, Cohel 
and Ferrell, 2009) consider the approach of assessing governance quality by building an index with 
several aspects of corporate governance to be of great importance. However, there are researchers 
who think the opposite. Gouiaa and Zéghal (2013) suggest that governance indexes cannot evaluate 
the quality of the board of directors. They conclude that governance indexes are highly imperfect and 
that investors and policymakers should exercise extreme caution in attempting to evaluate firm's 
quality or forecast future stock market performance from its ranking on any particular governance 
measure. Furthermore, they point out that the effect of governance indexes in financing costs is not 
clearly established. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) consider the specific characteristics of the board as 
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better determinants of the quality and the effectiveness of corporate governance. In the following 
paragraphs I explain briefly how governance indexes are developed.  
The construction of an index requires that all variables are weighted. Currently used corporate 
governance indexes combine different attributes of the governance to evaluate its overall quality. 
Indexes vary with respect to which attributes of corporate governance are included. The first indexes 
were created by academics and researchers, but the stream of governance research generated 
commercial indexes as well. Bebchuk et al. (2009) state that commercial indexes are designed 
primarily for institutional investors pursuing information about the quality of corporate governance 
system to support portfolio decisions, and to firms that want to signal their governance quality to 
investors. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) suggest that the main difference between the two types of 
indexes is based on their expertise and their analytical approach to corporate governance. 
First difference is in the weights given to governance features in the indexes. In the commercial ones 
features differ from one to another and from one firm to another. They are generally based on a 
number of governance factors which are not equally weighted. For example, the weights assigned to 
the components can be based on their correlations with the level of risk and past performance of the 
firm. Furthermore, the scores for commercial indexes and the weights of the items that compose them 
are also modified and updated to better reflect market trends in corporate governance. Therefore, the 
weighting scale of a commercial index can be significantly affected by the subjective judgment of 
analysts based on their experience and knowledge. 
According to Bozec and Bozec (2012), commercial indexes are generally expressed in relative terms 
with each firm rated relative to industry or size peers. They point out that academic indicators, on the 
other hand, give absolute ratings of the quality of governance practices regardless of comparable 
firms. Thus, it is possible that the weight assigned to a particular governance feature is not consistent 
with those used by financial market participants in assessing the quality of corporate governance. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) suggest that inconsistency in weights can lead investors to draw incorrect 
inferences and conclusions from empirical studies. Furthermore, Renders, Gaeremynck, and Sercu 
(2010) state that in commercial indexes board characteristics are most studied while other 
mechanisms are not included or they are poorly weighted.  
On the other hand, academic indexes include a smaller number of governance features that are 
targeted directly to the firms at hand. These attributes are equally weighted and take a binary value 
depending on the presence or absence of a governance practice. Bozec and Bozec (2012) state that 
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academic indexes are supposed to be less subjective than commercial o, since they are based on a 
simple count of the value assigned to each governance feature and they are usually expressed as 
absolute measures. Researchers have the opportunity to select the sample and the governance 
attributes that they consider relevant when they construct the indexes by themselves. 
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3. Hypotheses 
This study tests how well two D&O insurance variables, coverage and premium, can explain acquirer 
returns. This section outlines the hypotheses that are tested to find answers to my research questions 
provided in the introduction and I also provide a brief theoretical background behind the stated 
hypotheses. I present results in the empirical section of this study.  
3.1 D&O insurance coverage  
D&O insurance coverage can have an effect on the behavior of firm directors. As the legal 
environment is more litigious in the US than it is in Canada, management teams of firms operating in 
the US market are under higher personal risk when taking care of their work. Furthermore, firms 
listed in two different market areas are likely to receive more analyst coverage. Therefore, directors 
of cross-listed firms are under higher outside control and their incentive to work against the 
shareholders’ will to get personal benefits can be more difficult. This leads me to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Firms that are cross-listed in the US are more likely to purchase D&O insurance and they carry 
higher coverage limits than firms that are listed only in Canada. 
In theory higher D&O insurance protection can be either beneficial or harmful for shareholders. It 
can lead to destructive empire building behavior or otherwise it can correlate with abnormal profit 
performance. It is possible that the environment where the firm operates has an important influence 
on the outcome. Prior literature shows that firms listed in Canada are in general worse off when they 
carry higher limits of D&O insurance coverage. However, the legal environment is more litigious in 
the US and therefore high liability exposure can cause under-investment problems by inducing 
directors to be overly conservative and can cause them to forgo risky positive-NPV projects. If that 
was the case, M&A activity of firms with low D&O insurance coverage should be lower than the 
M&A activity of firms with high D&O insurance protection. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: M&A activity of firms with low D&O insurance coverage is relatively lower if firms are cross-
listed comparing to non-cross-listed firms.   
If that was the case, it is possible that cross-listed firms with higher D&O insurance coverage follow 
more optimal investment strategy that leads to higher acquirer returns than firms with low coverage. 
My next hypothesis is based on the idea that the underinvestment problem among firms with low 
D&O insurance coverage is more sever among cross-listed firms than non-cross-listed firms as they 
are operating under US legislation: 
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H3:    D&O insurance coverage has negative effect on acquirer returns, but the effect becomes 
positive when the firm is cross-listed in the US. 
3.2 D&O insurance premium 
According to Kang and Klausner (2011), D&O insurance premium contains information valuable to 
capital market participants. Core (2000) suggests that D&O insurance premium can be hypothesized 
to be a function of the quality of corporate governance and its business risk: 
 𝐷&𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =  𝑓(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) (1) 
Core states that governance structure quality and business risk, such as firm size and profitability, 
increases litigation risk. As low quality governance structures can be expected to increase firm’s D&O 
insurance premium, higher D&O insurance premium should lead to worse acquirer returns. This leads 
to my fourth hypothesis: 
 H4: D&O insurance premium has a negative relation with acquirer returns. 
According to Kang and Klausner (2011), disclosure of D&O insurance information can provide useful 
supplemental information on governance quality due to underwriters’ unique access to non-public 
information of non-disclosure agreements. As most firms purchase the D&O insurance, the 
information signaled through the disclosure of D&O insurance details can be the only reliable third-
party assessment of governance quality for firms that don’t receive any analyst coverage at all. The 
assumption that this piece of information is not otherwise publicly available lead to my fifth 
hypothesis: 
H5: Due to unique information contained in D&O insurance premium, it has higher explanatory 
power of acquirer returns than corporate governance indexes implicating that it works better as a 
proxy for the quality of corporate governance than the indexes. 
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4. Data and sample selection 
The initial sample consists of 2,238 acquisitions made by publicly traded firms listed in the TSX 
during the time period between 2003 and 2013. TSX is the largest stock exchange in Canada and 
represents a broad range of businesses from Canada, the US, and Europe. The reason why I use 
Canadian data is that D&O insurance data are publicly available there, unlike in the US. However, 
according to Core (2000), the more litigious US legal environment has been found to be significant 
determinant of the D&O decision. To study the effects of D&O insurance on firms operating in the 
US market, I divide the data into two subgroups: cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms based 
on their possible listing on one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq). Cross-listing 
and exposure to US securities litigation risk makes the sample firms close proxies for US firms. 
Dividing the data allows me to make comparison between firms operating in Canadian and the US 
market. The group of cross-listed firms consists of 636 completed acquisitions and the group of non-
cross-listed firms consists of 1,602 completed acquisitions.  
I extract my acquisition sample from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. The acquisitions that meet the following criteria are included in the sample: 
1. The acquisition is completed. 
2. The acquirer has D&O insurance information data (insurance coverage, insurance period, and 
insurance premium) from the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR). 
3. For the D&O insurance premium analysis, the acquirer has governance index data from Globe and 
Mail (GMI index) and Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI index).  
4. The acquirer has annual financial statement information available and stock return data (210 trading 
days prior to acquisition announcements) from Datastream. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample of acquisitions by announcement year: Panel A consists 
of cross-listed firms and Panel B consists of firms that are only listed in the TSX. The distribution for 
the whole sample is in Appendix B. The larger sample size of non-cross-listed firms is due to their 
larger share in the TSX. Table 1 shows that the number of acquisitions per year is quite uniform for 
both groups during the sample period. The mean acquirer market value of equity and the mean deal 
value are greatly larger for the cross-listed groups than for the non-cross-listed group. On the other 
hand, mean relative deal size is over two times larger for the non-cross-listed group than for the cross-
listed group.  
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 Table 1: Acquisitions by announcement year  
The sample consists of 2,238 completed acquisitions made by firms that were listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange between 
2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information. Panel A consists of 636 acquisitions 
that were made by firms that were cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq). Panel B consists 
of 1,602 acquisitions that were made by firms that were listed only in the Toronto Stock Exchange at the announcement date. 
The numbers in parentheses are medians. C$mm is millions of Canadian dollars. Absolute dollar values are expressed in real 
terms (2003 Canadian dollars) and calculated using the Bank of Canada inflation calculator. Relative size is defined in 
Appendix A. 
Panel A: Cross-listed firms 
Year No. of Percentage Mean acquirer Mean deal value Mean relative deal size 
 acquisitions of sample market value of equity [Median] [Median] 
    (C$mm) [Median]   
2003 55 8.6 2,621 161 0.27 
   [581] [93] [0.05] 
2004 59 9.3 2,249 272 0.31 
   [447] [95] [0.10] 
2005 56 8.8 3,390 504 0.18 
   [486] [51] [0.05] 
2006 62 9.7 3,754 618 0.30 
   [738] [33] [0.06] 
2007 73 11.5 4,265 499 0.28 
   [819] [81] [0.05] 
2008 61 9.6 10,196 506 0.73 
   [2,441] [81] [0.02] 
2009 48 7.5 12,640 625 0.15 
   [2,727] [58] [0.03] 
2010 72 11.3 7,134 348 0.37 
   [1,684] [75] [0.04] 
2011 58 9.1 6,078 182 0.21 
   [1,797] [85] [0.02] 
2012 51 8.0 9,918 402 0.33 
   [3,477] [125] [0.04] 
2013 41 6.4 6,072 133 0.05 
   [2,533] [31] [0.03] 
Total 636 100.0 6,070 394 0.31 
    [1,477] [86] [0.04] 
Panel B: Non-cross-listed firms 
Year No. of Percentage Mean acquirer Mean deal value Mean relative deal size 
 acquisitions of sample market value of equity [Median] [Median] 
    (C$mm) [Median]   
2003 71 4.4 663 64 0.38 
   [225] [11] [0.09] 
2004 104 6.5 602 123 0.88 
   [173] [27] [0.15] 
2005 147 9.2 537 60 0.55 
   [248] [20] [0.09] 
2006 137 8.6 746 108 1.04 
   [274] [22] [0.11] 
2007 183 11.4 1,017 105 0.34 
   [215] [20] [0.10] 
2008 164 10.2 845 57 0.44 
   [234] [23] [0.07] 
2009 155 9.7 1,180 81 0.37 
   [342] [34] [0.10] 
2010 161 10.0 645 76 0.98 
   [209] [25] [0.18] 
2011 180 11.2 971 130 1.27 
   [364] [47] [0.13] 
2012 134 8.4 1,137 214 0.31 
   [500] [44] [0.12] 
2013 166 10.4 760 184 0.35 
   [420] [28] [0.09] 
Total 1602 100.0 846 110 0.63 
    [326] [31] [0.11] 
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5. Methods and variables 
The reason why I study the effects of D&O insurance variables on shareholder wealth in an event 
study with acquisition announcements as event dates, is the fact that they are among the largest and 
most readily observable forms of corporate investment. Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) state that acquisitions tend to intensify the inherent conflicts of interest between 
directors and shareholders in larger public firms. Sometimes directors extract private benefits at the 
expense of shareholders by making value destroying acquisitions, and thus acquisitions suit very well 
for D&O insurance research.  
5.1 Structure of the analysis 
Before conducting analyses on D&O insurance coverage and D&O insurance premium, I first make 
comparisons between acquisitions made by cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms. To find out 
whether there are some fundamental differences in the deals that these two groups of firms make, I 
take a look at M&A activity, mean payment methods, mean target types, and relative deal sizes 
between the two groups. 
After the comparison between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, I focus first on the D&O 
insurance coverage and then on the D&O insurance premium. I use univariate analyses, multivariate 
regressions, and robustness checks for both of the variables. In both cases, I first take an initial look 
at univariate statistics to see if there are any broad patterns in the data that are consistent with my 
hypotheses about the relation between D&O insurance variables and acquirer returns. With the D&O 
insurance premium, I also compare univariate statistics to two corporate governance indexes. 
Specifically, I split the sample into different groups to compare the mean values of acquirer 
cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs), acquisition premiums, and a variety of deal 
characteristics. The results for D&O insurance coverage will be discussed in Section 6.2.1, and the 
results for D&O insurance premium will be discussed in Section 6.3.1.  
After the univariate analyses, I develop OLS regression models to examine the effect of D&O 
insurance variables on CARs. With the D&O insurance coverage, I first compare the effect of D&O 
insurance coverage on acquirer returns between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms by using a 
dummy variable approach. Then I conduct further analyses for the cross-listed firms: I run three stages 
of OLS regressions to see whether the relation between the coverage and the acquirer returns hold. 
Each stage adds new control variables to the model: The first one controls for deal characteristics, 
second one adds interactions of three target status indicators and two method-of-payment indicators, 
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and the third one adds acquirer characteristics. I conduct the same three stages of OLS regressions 
for the D&O insurance premium as well. The results for the D&O insurance coverage will be 
discussed in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. The results for the D&O insurance premium will be discussed 
in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.  
In the OLS regressions I use standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity introduced by 
White (1980), and acquirer clustering to calculate t-statistics for statistical significance based on two-
sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity is adjusted in most 
empirical studies to avoid the assumption that the errors have the same variance across all observation 
points. In real life events it is most likely that the variances differ and thus heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors allow the fitting of a model that does contain heteroscedastic residuals. 
Petersen (2009) points out that clustering standard errors at the acquirer level allows more flexibility 
in variance-covariance matrix as it relaxes the homoscedasticity assumption of the OLS regression 
by accounting for the fact that there might be a bunch of covariance structures that vary by a certain 
characteristic, but are homoscedastic within each cluster. 
Finally, I conduct endogeneity and sensitivity tests for my results. I use instrumental variable 
approach for the D&O insurance coverage by using industry average D&O insurance incidence and 
median coverage ratio as instruments for the D&O insurance variables. I use a sensitivity test for the 
D&O insurance premium and governance indexes by classifying acquirers as dictatorship versus 
democracy firms based on the median values of these variables. I include these new dummy variables 
into the regression model and test whether my results are affected. 
5.2 Variable construction 
In the following subsections, I discuss the measurement of three categories of variables: acquirer 
return as my dependent variable, D&O insurance measures and corporate governance indexes as my 
key explanatory variables, and acquirer and deal characteristics as my control variables.  
5.2.1 Acquirer return 
Event study methodology is a standard in finance literature in evaluating the stock price reaction to a 
specific event. I measure acquirer announcement effects by market model adjusted stock returns 
around initial acquisition announcements. The market model assumes a linear relationship between 
the return of a stock and the return of the market portfolio. I obtain the announcement date from 
SDC’s US Mergers and Acquisitions database and compute 5-day cumulative abnormal 
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announcement returns (CARs).1 Next, I introduce the construction of a CAR starting from abnormal 
return (AR) that is calculated as follows: 
 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 –  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (2) 
where actual return is realized return of an acquirer around the announcement date and expected 
return is required return of an acquirer around the announcement date from the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (see Sharpe, 1964). For each acquirer, the market model assumes that the returns 
generated are calculated as follows: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on stock i at time t. The subscript t indicates the time, the subscript i indicates 
a stock of an acquirer, and the subscript m indicates the market. 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the equal-weighted return of 
S&P/TSX Composite Index market portfolio during period t. Under the assumption of linearity and 
normality of returns, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a random error term for stock i at time t, 𝛽𝑖 is an acquirer-specific 
coefficient, to be estimated from the market model regressions. The market model expressed in Eq. 
(3) is used to compute the return on the stock that would have been expected during the 5-day event 
window around the acquisition announcement. Eq. (3) is estimated by using a 200-day estimation 
period from t = -11 to t = -210, where t = 0 is the acquisition announcement date. 
The abnormal return (AR) due to the announcement equals the actual return minus the expected 
return: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) (4) 
where daily ARs are computed for each day t to each acquirer i. The 5-day event window is the period 
between two days prior the acquisition announcement and two days after the acquisition 
announcement. The expected returns on the stock calculated from the Eq. (3) for the stock during the 
event window (-2, +2) are compared with the actual returns observed on each day within the event 
                                                 
 
1 For a random sample of 500 acquisitions from 1990 to 2000, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that the 
announcement dated provided by SDC are correct for 92.6% of the sample and rest of the cases are off by no more than 
two trading days. Therefore, using a 5-day window over event days (-2, 2) captures close to all of the announcement 
effect, without introducing substantial noise to my analysis. 
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window. The difference between the expected return and the actual return during the event window 
is the CAR. It is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝑖𝑡
 
(5) 
where ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑡=1 𝑖𝑡 is the sum of ARs during the event window. More specifically, the CAR during the 
event window is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖−𝐸𝑊 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
 
(6) 
where EW is the event window, T1 is the beginning date of the event window, and T2 is the ending 
date of the event window. 
5.2.2 Acquisition premiums 
In the univariate analyses, I examine the effect of D&O insurance coverage on acquisition premiums 
to explore the potential channels through which D&O insurance variables affects acquirer returns. 
Following recent literature (see Datta, Iskandara-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Lin et al., 2011), I define 
acquisition premiums (Acquisition premium_4w) as the ratio of the offer price to the target’s stock 
price four weeks prior to the initial announcement date minus one.  
5.2.3 D&O insurance coverage 
Following the literature (see Core, 1997; Chalmers et al., et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2011), I use two 
proxies for D&O insurance: (1) an indicator variable (Insurance 1/0) for whether the firm has 
purchased a D&O insurance policy; (2) a continuous variable (Insurance coverage ratio) defined as 
the personal coverage limit of the D&O insurance policy scaled by the firm’s average market value 
of equity in a year. According to Baker and Griffith (2007), the market value of equity is in theory a 
proxy for the maximum liability exposure and both D&O insurance coverage and damage award are 
often positively correlated with the market value of equity.2 If a firm does not purchase D&O 
insurance, the continuous variable is set to zero. If a firm publishes the information that they have 
                                                 
 
2 Some firms publish their D&O insurance information in US dollars, which I convert into Canadian dollars using the 
average yearly conversion rate between the two currencies. 
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purchased D&O insurance, but does not give information on the amount of coverage, the firm can 
only be used as an indicator variable, not as a continuous variable. 
5.2.4 D&O insurance premium 
Kang and Klausner (2011) suggest that D&O insurance premium can be converted into a proxy for 
governance quality with a few adjustments for market capitalization, coverage limits, and industry. 
To account for market capitalization, I use a ratio dividing a firm’s annual D&O insurance premium 
by its market capitalization on the acquisition date.  For the ratio to yield useful comparisons, it has 
to control for insurance limits. Follow Baker and Griffith (2007) and Kang and Klausner (2011), I 
adjust the D&O premium ratio by recalculating the premium per dollar of coverage. Furthermore, 
Core (2000) suggests to use a natural logarithmic transformation of the premium as it reflects the 
average cost of coverage to the firm, and does not affect the firm's choice of the limit. The proxy for 
the quality of corporate governance derived from the D&O insurance premium (Log(per dollar 
premium) then looks as follows: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚)  =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡)(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
         (7) 
This variable adjusts for coverage limits and market capitalizations. I account for industry differences 
by comparing the per dollar premium within 12 Fama-French industries. 
5.2.5 Globe and Mail Governance Index 
Globe and Mail Governance Index (GMI) is a commercial multifactor governance index developed 
by the Canadian newspaper, the Globe and Mail. The newspaper has rated and published boards of 
Canadian firms using a set of governance criteria since 2003. The index has been used by several 
previous studies (see e.g. Foerster and Huen, 2004; Ben-Amar and Boujenoui, 2008; Gouiaa and 
Zéghal, 2013). 
In 2013 the ratings were based on 36 individual questions that comprised four subcategories.  
The Globe and Mail gathers answers to these questions from information published in the annual 
shareholder proxy circulars of different firms which are listed in the S&P/TSX Composite Index. The 
first dimension is board composition that includes 10 questions worth 31 marks out of 100. Board 
composition evaluates the independence of the directors serving on the board, the audit committee, 
the compensation committee and the remuneration committee. The second dimension is shareholding 
and compensation that includes 10 questions worth 28 marks out of 100. Shareholding and 
compensation evaluates compensation policy and detects the ownership of directors and the CEO. 
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The third dimension is shareholder rights that includes 8 questions worth 28 marks out of 100. Finally, 
the fourth dimension is disclosure that includes 8 questions worth 13 marks out of 100. Disclosure 
measures the level and the quality of information on corporate governance. Theoretically, the higher 
value of the index implies a strong governance system and an effective board complying with the 
rules and requirements of good governance. 
5.2.6 Board Shareholder Confidence Index 
Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI) is an academic index, which has been developed and 
published since 2003 by The Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness of the 
Joseph L. Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto. It is an annual examination 
of the quality of governance practices related to boards of directors of publicly traded Canadian firms 
listed in the S&P/TSX Composite Index. The BSC Index is comprised of the factors often used by 
active shareholders to assess the quality of boards of directors. It seeks to capture factors affecting 
shareholders’ confidence in the boards’ abilities to fulfill their duties. 
In 2013 the ratings were developed using criteria separated into three groups that include altogether 
30 steps. The first one is individual potential that includes three subgroups and three additional 
subgroups that focus on the directors themselves. The second one is group potential that includes six 
subgroups that examine the board as a whole. Finally, the third one is board decision output that 
includes eight subgroups and 17 additional subgroups that analyze board outputs. Each firm begins 
with 100 points from which deductions are made.3 The index has been used by several previous 
studies (see Beekes, Brown and Chin, 2007; Switzer and Cao, 2011; Gouiaa and Zéghal, 2013).  
                                                 
 
3 BSCI index grading system has been changed during the time period of this study: Between 2003 and 2010 they 
published their grades in letters. In 2011 and 2012 letter grades and numerical grades were published concurrently with 
the highest numeral grade of 100. In 2013 only numerical grades were published with the highest grade of 150. Following 
Beekes et al. (2007), Switzer and Cao (2011), and Gouiaa and Zéghal (2013) I transformed the overall score ranging from 
C to AAA+ in a metric variable theoretically ranging between 20 and 100 to facilitate the analysis of the index and make 
scores for different years alike. Total letter grades are determined as follows: AAA+ = 100, AAA = 95, AA = 90, A = 75, 
B = 50, and C = <50. A higher value reflects a better quality of the board. 2013 grades are converted to reflect 100 point 
system. 
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5.2.7 Deal characteristics 
Following the prior literature, I use controls for deal characteristics in my regressions, including target 
ownership status, method of payment, industry relatedness of the acquisition, and whether the 
acquirer and the target are both from high tech industries.4  
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that acquirers making multiple acquisitions experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns when buying public firms and significantly positive abnormal 
returns when targets are private firms or subsidiaries. They interpret that acquirers capture a liquidity 
discount when buying private or subsidiary targets. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) show similar results, but they both also find that subsidiary targets 
generate the highest CARs. I take target status into account by creating three indicator variables 
denoted by public target (Public target 1/0), private target (Private target 1/0), and subsidiary target 
(Subsidiary target 1/0) to represent different types of targets. 
In the existing finance literature it is widely accepted that the method of payment is related to the 
stock market effect of acquisition announcements. Acquirers experience significantly negative 
abnormal returns when the acquisition is financed by equity. Negative returns are generally explained 
by the adverse selection problem in equity issuance analyzed by Myers and Majluf (1984). I create 
two indicator variables based on how the deal is financed: stock deal (Stock deal 1/0) and all-cash 
deal (All-cash deal 1/0). Stock deal equals one for acquisitions in which any amount of stock has been 
used to finance the deal and zero otherwise. All-cash deal equals one if only cash has been used and 
zero otherwise. According to the studies made by Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002), the stock 
price impact of stock-financed deals is less negative or even positive when the acquired firm is 
privately held. They suggest that bidding shareholders benefit from the active monitoring of the 
acquiring firm by newly created blockholders when closely held private target firms are purchased 
by stock. I also control for friendly deals (Friendly 1/0). 
I follow Masulis et al. (2007) and create the following six mutually exclusive and exhaustive deal 
categories from three target status indicators and two method-of-payment indicators to fully capture 
their effects: public all-cash deal (Public target 1/0 x all-cash deal 1/0), public stock deal (Public 
target 1/0 x stock deal 1/0), private all-cash deal (Private target 1/0 x all-cash deal 1/0), private stock 
deal (Private target 1/0 x stock deal 1/0), subsidiary all-cash deal (Subsidiary target 1/0 x all-cash 
                                                 
 
4 I omit relative deal size from the regressions as it reduces the sample size considerably. 
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deal 1/0), and subsidiary stock deal (Subsidiary target 1/0 x stock deal 1/0). I exclude the subsidiary 
stock deal indicator from the regression equations to avoid perfect multicollinearity with the 
regression intercept.  
Masulis et al. (2007) show negative coefficients for all five categories, and they infer that acquisitions 
of subsidiary targets by stock financing, the omitted deal type, generate the highest acquirer returns. 
Their findings are in line with Moeller et al. (2004) who show that holding the method of payment 
constant, public target acquisitions are associated with the lowest abnormal returns, private target 
acquisitions in between, and subsidiary target acquisitions are associated with the highest abnormal 
returns. Their findings are also in line with Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) who show that 
holding target ownership status constant, stock financing increases acquirer returns in deals involving 
private or subsidiary targets, while the reverse is true in deals involving public targets. In addition, 
they assume that the difference in acquirer returns between public target acquisitions and private 
target acquisitions is primarily due to stock-financed transactions, because the two types of deals 
generate similar stock price reactions when they are financed by cash.  
I use a binary variable (High tech 1/0) defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), that equals one if a 
deal is between firms in high tech industries and zero otherwise. Masulis et al. (2007) find that 
acquirer returns are lower in deals combining two high-tech firms. They expect the negative relation 
to happen because of the importance of human capital and intellectual property at these firms, which 
are often lost due to the higher employee turnover caused by acquisitions. Thus, it is difficult for 
technology firms to integrate smoothly after the acquisition and acquirers in these high tech 
transactions are more likely to underestimate the costs and overestimate the synergies generated by 
the combination.  
The predicted effect of diversifying acquisitions on acquirer returns is ambiguous. Villalonga (2004a, 
2004b) and Campa and Kedia (2002) find that diversification does not necessarily lead to lower firm 
value and sometimes it is associated with higher firm value. However, according to Morck et al. 
(1990) diversifying acquisitions usually destroy shareholder value, while potentially benefiting self-
interested directors. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that diversification can reduce firm risk and thus 
increase the expected utility of poorly diversified risk-averse directors. According to Morck et al. 
(1990), directors can also acquire unrelated assets that fit their own strengths which makes it more 
costly for shareholders to replace them. Accordingly, Masulis et al. (2007) show lower acquirer 
returns for diversifying acquisitions, but their results are insignificant. I classify an acquisition as 
diversifying if the target and the acquirer do not share a Fama-French industry code, and I create a 
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binary variable for diversifying acquisition (Unrelated deal 1/0) that equals one for diversifying 
acquisitions and zero otherwise. 
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Moeller et al. (2004) find that CARs increase in relative 
deal size, although Moeller et al. find the reverse for the subsample of large acquirers. However, 
including relative deal size reduces my sample size considerably, and I therefore omit it from the 
regression. It is included in the univariate analyses. 
5.2.8 Acquirer characteristics 
I control for cross-listing (cross-listed 1/0), firm size (Log(assets)), Tobin's q (Tobin’s q), leverage 
(Leverage), and free cash flow (FCF), all of which are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
acquisition announcement. I also control for pre-announcement stock price run-up (Stock price run-
up %), which is measured over the 200-day window from event day –210 to event day –11. Moeller 
et al. (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007) find that acquirer size is negatively correlated CARs. They find 
that larger acquirers pay on average higher premiums and make acquisitions that generate negative 
dollar synergies. They interpret the negative relation as evidence supporting the directorial hubris 
hypothesis by Roll (1986). According to Masulis et al. (2007), an alternative explanation is that large 
firm size serves as takeover defense. This is due to the fact that it takes more resources to acquire a 
larger target and thus directors of larger firms are more entrenched and more likely to make value 
reducing acquisitions. In my empirical tests, I define firm size as the log transformation of the 
acquirer's total assets. 
Prior studies find an ambiguous effect of an acquirer’s Tobin’s q on CARs. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1991) and Servaes (1991) show a positive relation for tender offer and public firm acquisitions. 
However, Moeller et al. (2004) find a negative relation in a comprehensive sample of acquisitions 
and Masulis et al. (2007) find Tobin's q having a negative effect on acquirer returns when stock price 
run-up is absent. I define Tobin’s q as the ratio of acquirer’s market value of assets minus the book 
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. 
I also control for the acquirer’s financial leverage. According to Masulis et al. (2007), leverage works 
as an important governance mechanism in many ways: First, higher debt levels reduce future free 
cash flows and limit directorial discretion. Second, leverage provides incentives for directors to 
improve firm performance, because they have to cede significant control to creditors and often lose 
their jobs if their firms face financial distress. Third, leverage is related to a firm's takeover protection 
(see also: Garvey and Hanka, 1999). Masulis et al. (2007) find positive, but insignificant, effect of 
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leverage on acquirer returns. I define leverage as a firm's book value of long-term debt and short-term 
debt divided by its market value of total assets. 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient for current FCF on acquirer 
returns, because additional FCFs give directors more resources to engage them in empire building. 
However, higher FCFs can also proxy for better recent firm performance. Therefore, it can be 
correlated with higher quality directors, who tend to make better acquisition decisions. Masulis et al. 
(2007) do not find significant effect of FCF on acquirer returns. I define FCF as operating income 
before depreciation minus interest expense minus income taxes minus capital expenditures, scaled by 
book value of total assets. 
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6. Empirical results 
In this section, I present the empirical results of my study. First, in Section 6.1 I compare M&A 
activity, industry composition, and the relation between payment methods, target types, and deal sizes 
with CARs between cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms. Second, in Section 6.2 I present the 
results of the D&O insurance coverage. Finally, in Section 6.3 I present the results of the D&O 
insurance premium. 
6.1 Comparison between cross-listed and non-cross-listed acquirers 
In this section, I compare M&A activity and the relation between payment methods, target types, and 
deal sizes with CARs between cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms. 
6.1.1 M&A activity 
First, I compare M&A activity between cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms. According to 
Boyer and Tennyson (2011), high liability exposure in the US can cause under-investment problem 
by inducing directors to be overly conservative and can cause them to forgo risky positive-NPV. If 
that was the case, firms with low D&O insurance coverage should do relatively less acquisitions if 
they were cross-listed comparing to non-cross-listed firms. As my sample includes D&O insurance 
data only for the firms that have made acquisitions during the sample period, I cannot get direct results 
of the M&A activity between the two groups. However, I can compare the weights of acquirers with 
different D&O insurance coverage levels in my sample.  
Figure 1 presents the no. of acquisitions for firms with different levels of D&O insurance coverage 
for the cross-listed group. It shows that a large share of cross-listed acquirers in my sample have high 
D&O insurance coverage limits. More specifically, 42.3% of cross-listed acquirers has over C$55M 
coverage limit indicating that firms with low D&O insurance coverage can be suffering from the 
under-investment problem.  
Figure 2 presents the no. of acquisitions for firms with different levels of D&O insurance coverage 
for the non-cross-listed group. It shows that the share of firms with low D&O insurance coverage 
levels is much larger than in cross-listed group. More specifically, only 9.3% of non-cross-listed 
acquirers has over C$55M coverage limit indicating that firms with low D&O insurance coverage are 
not suffering from the under-investment problem as much as the cross-listed firms with low D&O 
insurance coverage.  
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Figure 1: Annual D&O policy limit levels and no. of acquisitions: Cross-listed firms 
Figure 1 presents 470 acquisitions made by cross-listed firms between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O 
insurance information. The histogram is based on annual D&O insurance coverage levels and no. of acquisitions made 
by firms within each interval. Cumulative % presents the slope of change in the amount of acquisitions on the higher 
D&O insurance coverage level. C$mm is millions of Canadian dollars. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 2: Annual D&O policy limit levels and no. of acquisitions: Non-cross-listed firms 
Figure 2 presents 944 acquisitions made by non-cross-listed firms between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of 
D&O insurance information. The histogram is based on annual D&O insurance coverage levels and no. of acquisitions 
made by firms within each interval. Cumulative % presents the slope of change in the amount of acquisitions on the higher 
D&O insurance coverage level. C$mm is millions of Canadian dollars. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0
50
100
150
200
250
5 or below 15 25 35 45 55 Above 55
N
o
. 
o
f 
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
s
D&O insurance coverage (C$mm)
Annual policy limit level Cumulative %
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
5 15 25 35 45 55 Above 55
N
o
. 
o
f 
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
s
D&O insurance coverage (C$mm)
Annual policy limit level Cumulative %
30 
 
Differences in industry compositions between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms could affect my 
results as investment activity can vary between different industries. However, industries of cross-
listed and non-cross-listed acquirers in my sample are quite uniform. The industry compositions for 
both groups are presented in Appendix E. 
6.1.2 Payment method, target type, and deal size 
Because my sample separates non-cross-listed and cross-listed Canadian firms, it is different from 
the standard samples used in most of the M&A literature. Therefore, I first take a look whether there 
are some differences between the two groups relating to their payment methods, target types, and deal 
size and compare the mean values of acquirer abnormal announcement returns.  
Table 2 presents CARs by deal types for cross-listed firms (Panel A) and non-cross-listed firms (Panel 
B). In the cross-listed group acquirers experience higher abnormal returns when they pay for their 
acquisitions at least partly by stock as comparison to using only cash, and both payment methods 
result in positive CARs. CARs of cross-listed firms that make stock deals are 0.88% higher than 
CARs of all-cash deals. However, the difference is not statistically significant and thus I cannot 
conclude that the payment method affects the acquisition outcome with this sample. On the other 
hand, non-cross-listed firms using only cash experience 0.49% higher CARs than the ones using stock 
financing as well, but the difference is not statistically significant.5 In the non-cross-listed group both 
payment methods result in positive CARs like in the other group. The positive returns are the opposite 
of most of the M&A studies, which typically find that stock financed M&As result in negative CARs. 
However, according to a recent study made by Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2011), a stock-
financed acquisition announcement should be thought of as having two distinct components: a 
takeover component and an equity issue component. They suggest that after the implied equity 
financing component is taken away from the announcement return of stock acquirers, the method of 
payment generally has no further explanatory power in the cross-section of acquirer returns. 
As it is in the Canadian sample used by Lin et al. (2011) and US based samples, the acquisitions for 
both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms are significantly value-increasing for acquirer 
shareholders when comparing subsidiary targets to public targets. Also with my cross-listed group, 
acquisitions targeting private firms results in significantly higher returns than acquisitions targeting 
                                                 
 
5 There is no statistically significant difference in CARs between the payment methods when combining the non-cross-
listed and cross-listed groups. 
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public firms. In both groups large deals tend to be more value-increasing than small deals, but the 
results are not significant. 
Table 2: Acquirer returns and deal types between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms 
This table compares acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CAR (-2, +2) (%)) between subgroups based 
on deal characteristics for the sample of 2,238 acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange between 
2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of variables. Panel A consists of 636 acquisitions made by firms cross-listed 
in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) and Panel B consists of 1,602 acquisitions made by non-
cross-listed firms. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. The test of difference under target type is private vs. public and 
subsidiary vs. public, respectively. A deal is classified as a small (large) deal if the relative size is below (above) the 
sample median. *,**,***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Cross-listed firms 
  N Mean (%) Difference (%) p-value 
Payment method     
All-cash deals 137 0.178 -0.879 0.38 
Stock deals 114 1.057   
     
Target type     
Deals targeting a public firm 122 -0.948   
Deals targeting a private firm 280 1.074 -2.022*** 0.00 
Deals targeting a subsidiary 220 0.755 -1.703** 0.02 
     
Relative size     
Small deals 194 0.125 -0.559 0.26 
Large deals 194 0.910   
Panel B: Non-cross-listed firms 
 N Mean (%) Difference (%) p-value 
Payment method     
All-cash deals 269 0.900 0.488 0.49 
Stock deals 353 0.412   
     
Target type     
Deals targeting a public firm 198 -0.270   
Deals targeting a private firm 856 0.521 -0.791 0.28 
Deals targeting a subsidiary 516 1.414 -1.684** 0.03 
     
Relative size     
Small deals 536 0.315 -0.501 0.29 
Large deals 536 0.816   
6.2 D&O insurance coverage and acquirer returns 
Lin et al. (2011) find a negative relation between D&O insurance variables and acquirer returns in 
their sample consisting firms listed in the TSX. In this section, I will be studying whether there is a 
difference in the relation between D&O insurance and acquirer returns of firms that are listed only in 
TSX and firms that are cross-listed in the US. I will be looking for any difference in the relation 
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between D&O insurance coverage and acquirer returns between these two groups and whether one 
or both groups are in line with the findings of Lin et al. (2011). After the comparison between the two 
groups, I will focus on the cross-listed firms, as the relation between their acquirer returns and D&O 
insurance variables have not yet been studied. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the D&O 
insurance variables for cross-listed firms and Table 4 shows the summary statistics for non-cross-
listed firms. The summary statistics for the whole sample is in Appendix C. 
Table 3: Summary statistics of D&O insurance coverage: Cross-listed firms 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the time period between 2003 and 2013. 
The sample consists of 636 completed acquisitions made by firms that were listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange and 
cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq). All the acquisitions in the sample are subject 
to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information. C$mm is millions of Canadian dollars. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. 
      Percentiles   
Variable Mean Std. dev 25th 50th 75th N 
D&O insurance variable       
Insurance (1/0) 0.835 0.372 1.000 1.000 1.000 636 
Insurance coverage (C$mm) 84.770 78.260 30.000 50.000 100.000 470 
Insurance coverage ratio 0.090 0.181 0.014 0.035 0.079 454 
       
Acquirer return    
CAR (-2, +2) (%) 0.565 6.379 -2.442 0.242 3.137 636 
       
Acquisition premiums       
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 44.311 77.276 15.130 32.795 62.550 82 
       
Deal characteristics       
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.215 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 636 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.179 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 636 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.967 0.179 1.000 1.000 1.000 636 
Relative size 0.314 1.383 0.012 0.043 0.178 389 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.307 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 636 
Private target (1/0) 0.440 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 636 
Public target (1/0) 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 636 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.346 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 636 
High tech (1/0) 0.211 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.000 636 
       
Acquirer characteristics       
Log(assets) 14.415 2.193 12.983 14.329 16.144 611 
Market-to-book 2.134 2.643 0.800 1.680 2.555 604 
Leverage 25.261 21.452 2.730 25.000 38.800 630 
Tobin's q 1.905 1.470 1.181 1.518 2.011 626 
Stock price run-up (%) 0.058 0.436 -0.166 0.013 0.196 636 
FCF -0.032 0.306 -0.074 0.032 0.086 589 
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As can be seen from Table 3, the average CAR for the cross-listed group is about 0.57%. About 84% 
of cross-listed firms purchase D&O insurance policies, and in absolute terms their average policy 
limit is C$84.8M.  
Table 4: Summary statistics of D&O insurance coverage: Non-cross-listed firms 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the time period between 2003 and 2013. 
The sample consists of 1,602 completed acquisitions made by non-cross-listed firms that were listed only in the Toronto 
Stock Exchange. All the acquisitions in the sample are subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price 
information. C$mm is millions of Canadian dollars. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
      Percentiles   
Variable Mean Std. dev 25th 50th 75th N 
D&O insurance variable       
Insurance (1/0) 0.670 0.470 0.000 1.000 1.000 1602 
Insurance coverage (C$mm) 18.079 24.114 15.000 20.000 35.000 944 
Insurance coverage ratio 0.187 1.169 0.022 0.051 0.134 914 
       
Acquirer return    
CAR (-2, +2) (%) 0.735 7.661 -2.430 0.249 3.392 1602 
       
Acquisition premiums       
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 35.847 49.228 14.820 29.980 48.620 167 
       
Deal characteristics       
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.168 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.000 1602 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.220 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 1602 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.989 0.102 1.000 1.000 1.000 1602 
Relative size 0.629 2.312 0.037 0.109 0.365 1072 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.409 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1602 
Private target (1/0) 0.534 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 1602 
Public target (1/0) 0.124 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000 1602 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.322 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 1602 
High tech (1/0) 0.092 0.289 0.000 0.000 0.000 1602 
       
Acquirer characteristics       
Log(assets) 12.945 1.806 11.965 13.003 14.218 1575 
Market-to-book 1.604 4.904 0.870 1.420 2.070 1465 
Leverage 30.770 26.415 5.758 28.585 51.438 1586 
Tobin's q 1.762 1.959 1.110 1.338 1.869 1544 
Stock price run-up (%) 0.042 0.432 -0.173 0.006 0.186 1602 
FCF -0.030 0.202 -0.074 0.016 0.069 1454 
Table 4 shows that the average CAR for non-cross-listed group is about 0.74%, which is higher than 
the average CAR of the cross-listed group. About 67% of non-cross-listed firms purchase D&O 
insurance policies, and in absolute terms their average policy limit is C$18.1M. This means that the 
share of firms purchasing the D&O insurance and the average coverage limit are lower in the non-
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cross-listed group than in the cross-listed group. On the other hand, the insurance coverage ratio is 
higher for non-cross-listed firms than for cross-listed firms, which show that non-cross-listed firms 
carry relatively higher D&O insurance policies. The share of firms carrying a D&O insurance policy 
for the whole sample is about 72%, which is in line with the sample Lin et al. are using in their study.  
6.2.1 Univariate analyses 
Before conducting regression analysis in the next section, I first take an initial look at univariate 
statistics to see if there are any broad patterns in the data between cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
firms. Then, I split the two sample groups into subgroups based on their median coverage ratio to see 
if there are any broad patterns in the data between firms with different levels of D&O insurance 
protection. I compare the mean values of acquirer CARs, acquirer premiums, and variety of deal and 
acquirer characteristics. The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
  Table 5: Univariate analysis of cross-listing 
This table presents univariate statistics for 1,368 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information, 
and the existence of the insurance. The table reports averages of acquirer abnormal announcement returns, acquisitions 
premiums, and deal and acquirer characteristics for subsamples based on cross-listing status. Firms that are listed only 
in TSX are the non-cross-listed group and firms that are cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, 
or Nasdaq) are the cross-listed group. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. *,**,***: statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 Cross-listed firms  Non-cross-listed firms   
Variable Mean N   Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return       
CAR (-2, +2) (%) 0.608 454  0.389 914 0.217 0.56 
        
Acquisition premiums        
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 43.112 33  36.707 77 6.405 0.52 
        
Deal characteristics        
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.231 454  0.179 914 0.052** 0.03 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.149 454  0.157 914 -0.008 0.70 
Relative size 0.319 276  0.157 914 0.162 0.70 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.334 454  0.480 914 -0.146*** 0.00 
Private target (1/0) 0.453 454  0.567 914 -0.114*** 0.00 
Public target (1/0) 0.182 454  0.094 914 0.088*** 0.00 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.343 454  0.320 914 0.023 0.40 
Both high tech (1/0) 0.226 454  0.120 914 0.106*** 0.00 
        
Acquirer characteristics        
Leverage 25.624 454  34.609 908 -8.985*** 0.00 
Log(assets) 14.679 444  13.347 904 1.333*** 0.00 
Tobin's q 1.795 451  1.680 902 0.115 0.15 
FCF -0.038 427  -0.052 813 0.014 0.44 
Market-to-book 2.127 434  1.461 877 0.666*** 0.00 
Stock price run-up (%) 0.045 454  0.009 914 0.036*** 0.00 
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In Table 5, I compare the mean values of acquirer CARs, acquisition premiums, and deal and acquirer 
characteristics between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. Compared to summary statistics in 
Tables 3 and 4, the average CAR of cross-listed firms has increased, and the average CAR of non-
cross-listed firms has reduced. Furthermore, the average acquisition premium of cross-listed firms 
has reduced and the average acquisition premium of non-cross-listed firms has increased. The main 
difference between these tables is that the summary statistics include all firms in the sample, but Table 
5 only firms that have purchased D&O insurance. The changes in CARs and acquisition premiums 
of the two groups can indicate that cross-listed firms can benefit from the D&O insurance purchase. 
However, the differences between CARs or acquisition premiums between cross-listed and non-
cross-listed firms are not statistically significant. Thus, more research has to be done to find out 
whether the effect of D&O insurance varies between the two groups.  
Other findings in Table 5 are the following: Cross-listed firms (i) make significantly more all-cash 
deals, and (ii) make significantly less unrelated deals, which are associated with positive acquirer 
returns in the prior literature (see e.g. Masulis et al., 2007). On the other hand, (iii) cross-listed firms 
target significantly more public targets and less private targets, (iv) are significantly less leveraged, 
(v) are significantly larger, and (vi) have significantly higher stock price run-ups before acquisitions, 
which are associated with negative acquirer returns in the prior literature (see e.g. Masulis et al., 
2007). These results suggest that cross-listing do affect both the deal and acquire characteristics, but 
cross-listing cannot explain acquirer returns alone. 
Lin et al. (2011) show that the decision to purchase D&O insurance can affect acquirer returns as 
well. I find the same negative relation, albeit insignificant, between the purchase of D&O insurance 
and acquirer returns with the non-cross-listed group. With the cross-listed firms there appears to be 
no relation as the p-value of the difference is high (0.67). The inexistent relation can be due to the 
fact that the share of cross-listed firms purchasing the insurance is really high, and thus the sample 
size for firms not having the insurance is small. I include the results of univariate analysis based on 
the insurance indicator in Appendix D, as they can help to interpret results relating to non-cross-listed 
firms later in this study. 
As the insurance indicator does not provide significant results for the cross-listed group, I also 
compare how the level of D&O insurance coverage ratio affects acquirer returns between cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed firms. I split both groups based on the median coverage ratio into subgroups of 
low coverage ratio and high coverage ratio. Then I compare CARs, acquisitions premiums, and deal 
and acquirer characteristics between these subgroups in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Univariate analysis of D&O insurance coverage: High and low ratios 
This table presents univariate statistics for 1,368 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information, and the existence 
of the insurance. The table reports averages of acquirer abnormal announcement returns, acquisitions premiums, and deal 
and acquirer characteristics for subsamples based on below and above median coverage ratios (high coverage and low 
coverage). Panel A consist of 454 acquisitions made by firms cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, 
or Nasdaq). Panel B consists of 914 acquisitions made by non-cross-listed firms. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. 
*,**,***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Variable definitions are 
in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Cross-listed firms 
 Low coverage  High coverage   
Variable Mean N   Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return        
CAR (-2, +2) (%) -0.411 227  1.459 227 -1.870*** 0.00 
        
Acquisition premiums        
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 47.579 14  39.821 19 7.758 0.59 
        
Deal characteristics        
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.271 227  0.198 227 0.073* 0.07 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.126 227  0.169 227 -0.044 0.19 
Relative size 0.080 142  0.573 134 -0.493 0.19 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.401 227  0.278 227 0.123** 0.01 
Private target (1/0) 0.377 227  0.516 227 -0.139*** 0.00 
Public target (1/0) 0.203 227  0.165 227 0.038 0.31 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.382 227  0.310 227 0.071 0.11 
Both high tech (1/0) 0.203 227  0.246 227 -0.043 0.27 
        
Acquirer characteristics        
Leverage 27.541 227  23.706 227 3.835* 0.06 
Log(assets) 15.910 227  13.391 217 2.519*** 0.00 
Tobin's q 1.992 227  1.596 224 0.397*** 0.00 
FCF -0.011 213  -0.066 214 0.055* 0.09 
Market-to-book 2.414 221  1.831 213 0.583** 0.02 
Stock price run-up (%) 0.071 227   0.019 227 0.053** 0.02 
Panel B: Non-cross-listed firms 
 Low coverage  High coverage   
Variable Mean N   Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return        
CAR (-2, +2) (%) 0.063 457  0.715 457 -0.652 0.16 
        
Acquisition premiums        
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 36.117 43  37.454 34 -1.337 0.93 
        
Deal characteristics        
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.214 457  0.144 457 0.070*** 0.01 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.142 457  0.172 457 -0.030 0.21 
Relative size 0.150 316  0.570 282 -0.421 0.21 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.525 457  0.434 457 0.091*** 0.01 
Private target (1/0) 0.519 457  0.616 457 -0.097*** 0.00 
Public target (1/0) 0.127 457  0.061 457 0.066*** 0.00 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.330 457  0.310 457 0.020 0.51 
Both high tech (1/0) 0.081 457  0.159 457 -0.078*** 0.00 
        
Acquirer characteristics        
Leverage 39.240 456  29.936 452 9.304*** 0.00 
Log(assets) 14.290 456  12.386 448 1.904*** 0.00 
Tobin's q 1.641 455  1.720 447 -0.079 0.46 
FCF -0.018 407  -0.086 406 0.068*** 0.00 
Market-to-book 2.014 448  0.885 429 1.129*** 0.00 
Stock price run-up (%) 0.039 457   -0.021 457 0.060*** 0.00 
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Panel A of Table 6 shows that (i) cross-listed firms in the high coverage subgroup experience on 
average significantly higher acquirer CARs and pay insignificantly lower acquisition premiums. 
Their mean CARs are on average 1.9% higher than in the other subgroup. Cross-listed firms with 
high coverage (ii) make significantly less unrelated deals, (iii) target significantly more private firms, 
(iv) are significantly smaller, (v) their Tobin's q ratios are significantly lower, and (vi) their stock 
price run-ups before acquisition announcements are significantly lower than in the low coverage 
subgroup of cross-listed firms, which all are associated with positive CARs in the prior literature (see 
e.g. Masulis et al., 2007). On the other hand, cross-listed firms with high coverage (vi) make 
significantly less all-cash deals and (vii) are significantly less in leverage than firms in the low 
coverage subgroup, which both are associated with negative CARs in the prior literature (see e.g. 
Masulis et al., 2007). Furthermore, (viii) market-to-book ratios of cross-listed firms with high 
coverage are significantly lower than in the low coverage group indicating that their valuations are 
lower. High market-to-book ratio is associated with negative CARs in the prior literature, if it leads 
to more stock financing of deals. However, that is not the case with the low coverage subgroup of 
cross-listed firms.  
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results for non-cross-listed firms with above and below median D&O 
insurance coverage ratios. There is no significant difference in the average CARs or acquisition 
premiums between the two subgroups. Non-cross-listed firms with high coverage (i) make 
significantly less unrelated deals, (ii) target significantly more private targets, (iii) target significantly 
less public targets, (iv) are significantly smaller, and (v) their stock price run-ups before acquisition 
announcements are significantly lower than firms in the non-cross-listed low coverage group, which 
all are associated with positive CARs in the prior literature (see e.g. Masulis et al., 2007). On the 
other hand, non-cross-listed firms with high coverage (vi) make significantly less all-cash deals, (vii) 
are significantly less in leverage, (viii) make significantly more acquisitions between two high tech 
firms, and (ix) their Tobin's q ratios are significantly higher than firms in the non-cross-listed low 
coverage group, which all are associated with negative CARs in prior literature (see e.g. Masulis et 
al., 2007). 
6.2.2 Multivariate analysis: Cross-listing 
In this section, I compare the impact of D&O insurance coverage on CARs between cross-listed firms 
and non-cross-listed firms using multivariate regression. First, I show that my results are in line with 
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Lin et al. (2011) with the non-cross-listed firms and that the results differ for the cross-listed ones. 
The empirical model is as follows: 
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑓(𝐷&𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐷&𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 
𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) 
(8) 
In Eq. (8), the dependent variable is the acquirer’s five-day CAR (-2, +2) around each announcement. 
The independent variables are the D&O insurance measures: the insurance indicator and insurance 
coverage ratio. I develop a dummy variable based on firm’s cross-listing status and interact it with 
the insurance measure to test whether cross-listing affects the relation between acquirer returns and 
D&O insurance variables. The results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of Eq. (8) are 
presented in Table 7, controlling for industry and year dummies, and deal characteristics described in 
Section 5.2. Industry fixed-effects are based on 12 Fama-French industry groups.6 The t-statistics are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering.  
In column 1 of Table 7, the D&O insurance indicator is used as the key independent variable, while 
in column 2 I use the insurance coverage ratio instead. As can be seen from the table, the coefficients 
are significantly negative for the insurance measures alone, which is in line with the findings of Lin 
et al. (2011). However, the relation for insurance coverage ratio becomes significantly positive when 
cross-listing is taken into account. The same positive relation exists for the insurance indicator as 
well, but the results are not significant. The insignificance can be due to the fact that very high share 
of cross-listed firms purchase the insurance and therefore the number of firms not carrying the 
insurance is relatively small.  
My results suggest that D&O insurance decision has an effect on acquirer returns: the impact is 
negative for non-cross-listed firms and positive for cross-listed firms. As firms that are not purchasing 
the insurance are included in the coverage ratio as zeros, the negative effect of the insurance purchase 
among non-cross-listed firms makes the negative coefficient larger (see Appendix D). The point 
estimates indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in the insurance coverage ratio increases 
average acquirer CARs by 1.4% among cross-listed firms and decreases them by -0.7% among non-
cross-listed firms, other things being equal. Hence, the effect of D&O insurance on CARs is opposite 
between these two groups and the effect appears both economically and statistically significant. 
                                                 
 
6 See French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data\ library.html) for definitions. 
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  Table 7: Regression of acquirer returns and D&O insurance coverage: Cross-listing 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of CAR (-2, +2) (%) on measures of D&O 
insurance use. The sample consists of 1,368 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O 
insurance and stock price information, and the existence of the insurance. A dummy variable cross-
listed (1/0) is used to separate firms that are cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, 
Amex, or Nasdaq) from the other sample. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) are used 
in computing t-statistics [in brackets]. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are robust to both cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. The coefficients of the constant, 
year, and industry dummies are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2)   
D&O insurance measures    
Insurance (1/0) -3.977***   
 [-4.030]   
Insurance (1/0) x cross-listed (1/0) 0.396   
 [0.760]   
Insurance coverage ratio  -0.669***  
  [-4.830]  
Insurance coverage ratio x cross-listed (1/0)  7.767***  
  [2.570]  
Deal characteristics    
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.521 0.549  
 [0.960] [1.010]  
Stock deal (1/0) 0.557 0.589  
 [0.720] [0.830]  
Friendly deal (1/0) 1.554 1.389  
 [1.780] [1.630]  
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.153 0.165  
 [0.370] [0.420]  
Private target (1/0) -0.066 -0.262  
 [-0.060] [-0.230]  
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.196 0.100  
 [0.170] [0.090]  
Public target (1/0) -1.868 -1.902  
 [-1.400] [-1.420]  
    
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes  
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes  
Adjusted-R2 0.007 0.029  
Number of observations 1368 1368   
40 
 
6.2.3 Multivariate analysis: Additional control variables 
In the previous section I showed that the results of my regression model of the relation between 
acquirer returns and D&O insurance are in line with Lin et al. (2011), and that cross-listing affects 
the results by turning the relation to be positive between D&O insurance coverage and acquirer 
returns. Now, I focus on the cross-listed firms and add more control variables (described in Section 
5.2) to the model in Table 8: Acquirer characteristics in columns (1) and (3) and five deal types based 
on M&A currency and target ownership status from the acquisition classification scheme in columns 
(2) and (4). After adding these control variables, my sample size is 547 acquisitions for the insurance 
indicator and 454 acquisitions for the coverage ratio. Now, the empirical model is as follows: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑓(𝐷&𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)   
(9) 
As can be seen from the column (3) of Table 8, adding firm characteristics as control variables do not 
reduce the significance of the relation between D&O insurance coverage ratio and acquirer returns. 
The t-statistics of the insurance coverage ratio is 4.29 in column (3). Hence, the effect of D&O 
insurance coverage ratio on acquirer CARs is statistically significant. As it was the case in the 
univariate analysis (see Appendix D), insurance indicator in column (1) does not have significant 
relationship with acquirer returns. Again, a large share of cross-listed firms purchase D&O insurance, 
which can explain the insignificance of the results. 
In columns (2) and (4) in Table 8, I add the acquisition classification scheme introduced by Masulis 
et al. (2007). I decompose my sample into five deal types based on M&A currency and target 
ownership status. As mentioned in the Section 5.2.8, I exclude the subsidiary stock deal indicator 
from the original six deal types to avoid perfect multicollinearity with the regression intercept. The 
decomposition of deal types yields to higher explanatory power of my model: The adjusted-R2 for 
the D&O insurance coverage ratio increases from 5.3% in column (2) to 8.5% in column (4). The t-
statistics of the D&O insurance coverage ratio increases to 4.52 in column (4). Hence, the effect of 
D&O insurance on acquirer CARs remains statistically significant. 
For my control variables, acquirer size has significantly negative effect on acquirer returns in column 
(1), which is in line with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004). Stock deal has a significant positive 
relation with the acquirer returns in column (2), and deal types including public targets with both 
financing types have significant negative relations with acquirer returns in columns (2) and (4). My 
results are in line with Masulis et al. (2007) and the prior literature.  
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Table 8: Regression of acquirer returns and D&O insurance coverage: Additional controls 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of CAR (-2, +2) (%) on measures of D&O insurance use. The sample 
consists of 547 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and cross-listed in one of 
the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance 
and stock price information. The regressions control for deal and acquirer characteristics, deal types, and year and industry 
fixed-effects. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) are used in computing t-statistics [in brackets]. *, **, ***: 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are 
robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. The coefficients of the constant, year, and 
industry dummies are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
D&O insurance measures      
Insurance (1/0) 1.130 1.241    
 [1.400] [1.460]    
Insurance coverage ratio    10.820*** 11.182*** 
    [4.290] [4.520] 
Deal characteristics      
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.237 1.953  0.088 0.561 
 [0.380] [0.620]  [0.140] [0.200] 
Stock deal (1/0) 1.522 5.679**  1.068 5.167* 
 [1.400] [2.020]  [0.950] [1.740] 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.424 0.603  0.471 0.703 
 [0.440] [0.660]  [0.490] [0.760] 
Unrelated deal (1/0) -0.071 -0.175  -0.165 -0.334 
 [-0.110] [-0.270]  [-0.240] [-0.003] 
Private target (1/0) 0.259 1.029  -0.298 0.069 
 [0.150] [0.390]  [-0.180] [0.030] 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.281 1.015  0.082 0.362 
 [0.160] [0.360]  [0.050] [0.140] 
Public target (1/0) -2.387 3.650  -2.551 3.971 
 [-1.340] [1.180]  [-1.470] [1.260] 
Acquirer characteristics 
Acquirer characteristics 
     
Leverage 0.009 0.004  -0.007 -0.015 
 [0.450] [0.180]  [-0.420] [-0.900] 
Log(assets) -0.441** -0.348*  -0.127 -0.008 
 [-2.070] [-1.680]  [-0.580] [-0.040] 
Tobin's q -0.337 -0.310  -0.351 -0.356 
 [-1.180] [-1.090]  [-1.260] [-1.280] 
FCF -0.101 -0.090  0.773 0.720 
 [-0.110] [-0.100]  [1.200] [1.130] 
Market-to-book -0.035 -0.073  0.091 0.073 
 [-0.330] [-0.650]  [0.960] [0.740] 
Stock price run-up (%) -0.990 -0.837  -0.683 -0.539 
 [-1.590] [-1.300]  [-1.080] [-0.840] 
Deal types      
Public target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0)  -10.583***   -11.634*** 
  [-3.280]   [-3.220] 
Public target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0)  -6.094*   -5.947* 
  [-1.690]   [-1.670] 
Private target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0)  -2.553   -2.774 
  [-0.780]   [-0.850] 
Private target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0)  -1.206   0.294 
  [-0.380]   [0.100] 
Subsidiary target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0)  -2.390   -0.997 
  [-0.730]   [-0.340] 
      
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.020 0.048  0.054 0.085 
Number of observations 547 547  454 454 
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6.2.4 Instrumental variables approach 
Any study dealing with the interaction between governance structure and firm decision making can 
have endogeneity issues. In my study the primary dependent variable in my tests is a short-term 
market-based measure and thus endogeneity might be less of a problem relative to other studies in 
the literature. Nevertheless, firms with D&O insurance can have firm-specific characteristics that I 
have thus far failed to account for and which can affect the D&O insurance purchase decision and the 
quality of acquisition decisions. I attempt to address this issue using an instrumental variable 
approach. 
Following the recent literature (Adams, Lin, and Zou, 2011; Lin, Ma Malatesta, and Xuan (2011); 
Lin et al., 2011), I use the industry average D&O insurance incidence and median coverage ratio as 
instruments for the firm’s D&O insurance incidence and coverage ratio, respectively. There are two 
rationales for using these instrument variables. First, as Adams et al. (2011) point out, it is possible 
that firms in the same industry and/or region compete for the same directors in the local labor market. 
When firms are competing for most talented directors, their directorial compensation packages (e.g. 
including D&O insurance coverage) can be influenced by the compensation packages offered by 
competitors in the same industry of region.  Second, firms in the same industry face similar business 
risks and business cycles, which mean that the risk of facing shareholder litigation often follows 
industry patterns. As a result, industry average/median D&O insurance policy will be correlated with 
a firm’s D&O insurance coverage but it is unlikely to influence the quality of a firm’s acquisitions in 
any other way than through the firm’s D&O insurance plan (see: Lin et al., 2011). 
In the instrumental variable approach, I run a first-stage regression with the D&O insurance indicator 
variable and the continuous variable as the dependent variable. These regressions are not reported for 
brevity. The key instrumental variable for the former is the industry average of the D&O insurance 
indicator variable and the key instrumental variable for the latter is the industry median D&O 
insurance coverage ratio. In both cases, the first-stage instrument variable regressions include all the 
control variables from Table 8. I use the fitted values from these first-stage regressions as explanatory 
variables in the second-stage regressions in Table 9, in which the D&O insurance indicator is reported 
in column (1) and the D&O insurance coverage ratio in column (2). 
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Table 9: Instrumental variables approach 
This table shows the results of second-stage regressions between CAR (-2, +2) (%) and instruments for D&O insurance use. The 
sample consists of 487 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and cross-listed in one 
of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and 
stock price information. The regressions control for deal and acquirer characteristics, deal types, and year and industry fixed-effects.  
The insurance indicator is instrumented with fitted values from a first-stage regression on industry mean insurance incidence and 
the insurance coverage ratio is instrumented with industry median coverage based on Fama-French 30 industries and control 
variables. Shea's (1997) partial R2 is a measure of instrument variable relevance.  First-stage F-test is the test of excluded IV in the 
first-stage regression. Standard errors are used in computing t-statiscs [in brackets], and they are clustered at the acquirer level, 
robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are robust to both cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. The coefficients of the constant, year, and industry dummies are omitted for 
brevity. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2)   
D&O insurance measures     
Insurance (1/0) 2.500    
 [1.530]    
Insurance coverage ratio  22.800***   
  [8.540]   
Deal characteristics     
All-cash deal (1/0) 1.500 0.300   
 [0.520] [0.100]   
Stock deal (1/0) 5.000 5.300*   
 [1.730] [1.770]   
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.900 0.800   
 [1.100] [1.020]   
Unrelated deal (1/0) -0.100 -0.700   
 [-0.140] [-0.970]   
Private target (1/0) 0.400 -0.500   
 [0.170] [-0.200]   
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.500 -0.300   
 [0.180] [-0.100]   
Public target (1/0) 3.800 3.500   
 [1.240] [1.120]   
Acquirer characteristics     
Leverage 0.000 -0.000   
 [0.550] [-1.230]   
Log(assets) -0.300 0.400**   
[-1.500] [2.120]   
Tobin's q -0.400 -0.200   
 [-1.520] [-0.850]   
FCF 0.600 0.800   
 [0.990] [1.350]   
Market-to-book 0.000 0.200   
 [0.100] [1.510]   
Stock price run-up (%) -0.700 -0.500   
 [-1.060] [-0.790]   
Deal types     
Public target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0) -10.600*** -12.000***   
 [-3.010] [-3.250]   
Public target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0) -6.700* -6.100*   
 [-1.870] [-1.770]   
Private target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0) -1.300 -3.400   
 [-0.390] [-1.020]   
Private target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0) -1.200 0.200   
 [-0.380] [0.070]   
Subsidiary target (1/0) x all-cash deal 
(1/0) 
-1.700 -0.800   
 [-0.540] [-0.280]   
     
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes   
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes   
First-stage Shea's partial R2 0.284 0.528   
First-stage F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000   
Second-stage adjusted-R2 0.074 0.080   
Number of observations 487 487   
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In Table 9, the p-values of relevant F-tests of industry average D&O insurance incidence or the 
industry median coverage ratio as the excluded instrument are highly significant. I also calculate 
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 from the first-stage regressions for both the indicator and continuous D&O 
insurance variables, and these values well exceed the suggested hurdle of 10% indicating that my 
instrument variables are relevant in explaining the variation of the potentially endogenous regressors. 
These results suggest that the empirical results are robust after the instrumentation. Both variables 
have positive relation with acquirer returns and the effect of D&O insurance coverage ratio on 
acquirer returns remains statistically significant. 
6.3  D&O insurance premium and acquirer returns 
In this section, I use the sample of cross-listed firms for my analysis on the relation between D&O 
insurance premium and acquirer returns. Table 10 shows the summary statistics for variables used in 
this section, including two corporate governance indexes. 
 Table 10: Summary statistics of D&O insurance premium 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The sample consists of 571 completed 
acquisitions made by firms that were listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange and cross-listed in one of the US stock 
exchanges (NYSE, Amex or Nasdaq) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance, corporate 
governance index, and stock price information. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
      Percentiles   
Variable Mean Std. dev 25th 50th 75th N 
Governance measures       
Log(per dollar premium) -12.173 2.096 -13.729 -3.593 -10.540 411 
GMI index 72.903 14.210 62.000 71.000 86.000 422 
BSCI index 67.348 22.147 50.000 75.000 88.000 424 
       
Acquirer return     
CAR (-2, +2) (%) 0.534 6.289 -2.467 0.232 3.142 571 
       
Acquisition premiums       
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 47.076 84.195 15.240 38.750 62.400 65 
       
Deal characteristics       
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.222 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 571 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.170 0.376 0.000 0.000 0.000 571 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.965 0.184 1.000 1.000 1.000 571 
Relative size 0.329 1.470 0.013 0.041 0.164 342 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.320 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 571 
Private target (1/0) 0.438 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 571 
Public target (1/0) 0.189 0.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 571 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.354 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 571 
Both high tech (1/0) 0.217 0.413 0.000 0.000 0.000 571 
       
Acquirer characteristics       
Log(assets) 14.457 2.227 13.049 14.401 16.190 551 
Market-to-book 2.136 2.726 0.800 1.680 2.550 541 
Leverage 25.221 21.602 1.935 25.080 38.860 567 
Tobin Q 1.895 1.446 1.162 1.515 2.011 563 
Stock price run-up (%) 0.051 0.432 -0.167 0.011 0.190 571 
FCF -0.036 0.311 -0.084 0.029 0.085 531 
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6.3.1 Univariate analysis 
Before conducting regression analysis in the next section, I first take an initial look at univariate 
statistics to see if there are any broad patterns in the data about the relation between acquisition returns 
and proxies for the quality of corporate governance: D&O insurance premium, GMI index, and BSCI 
index. I split the sample into subgroups of firms with below and above median values of these proxies 
and compare the mean values of acquirer CARs, acquirer premiums, and variety of deal 
characteristics. The results are presented in Table 11. 
In Table 11, Panel A presents the univariate statistics of D&O insurance premium variable Log(per 
dollar premium), Panel B the univariate statistics of GMI index, and Panel C the univariate statistics 
of BSCI index. As can be seen from the table, the Low per dollar premium group (firms paying less 
for their D&O insurance coverage on average), experience significantly higher CARs than firms in 
the High per dollar group. The difference between the CARs of the two groups is about 1.9%. In this 
sample, firms in the Low per dollar group also pay less for their targets than firms in the High per 
dollar group, but the difference is not statistically significant. There is no statistical significance 
between acquirer returns or premiums with either of the governance indexes. 
Regarding deal characteristics, I observe that firms in the Low per dollar premium group make more 
acquisitions financed by cash (moderate statistical significance in difference) and they acquire 
significantly more private targets than firms in the High per dollar premium group. Both of these 
factors are typically associated with positive acquirer returns in the prior literature. Furthermore, firms 
in the Low per dollar group make significantly less unrelated deals and target significantly less public 
firms that are typically associated with negative acquirer returns in the prior literature. On the other 
hand, firms in the Low per dollar premium group target significantly less subsidiaries and they make 
significantly more deals between two high tech firms, which are typically associated with positive 
acquirer returns. The only significant difference between low and high governance index subgroups 
is that firms low governance index firms make significantly more unrelated deals. The same relation 
exists for both governance indexes. 
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 Table 11: Univariate analysis of D&O insurance premium and governance indexes  
This table presents univariate statistics for 411 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) and cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the 
availability of D&O insurance, corporate governance index, and stock price information. The table reports averages of 
acquirer abnormal announcement returns, acquisitions premiums, and deal characteristics divided into above median and 
below median subsamples for D&O insurance premium (Panel A), Globe and Mail Governance Index (GMI, Panel B), and 
Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI, Panel C). Log(Per dollar premium) is the natural logarithmic transformation of 
per dollar D&O insurance premium. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. *,**,***: statistically significantly different from 
zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Log(per dollar premium) 
  Low per dollar premium  High per dollar premium   
Variable   Mean N  Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return      
CAR (-2, +2) (%)  1.509 206  -0.439 205 1.948*** 0.00 
         
Acquisition premiums         
Acquisition premium_4w (%)  38.198 18  50.414 12 -12.216 0.46 
         
Deal characteristics         
All-cash deal (1/0)  0.194 206  0.268 205 -0.074* 0.08 
Stock deal (1/0)  0.146 206  0.137 205 0.009 0.79 
Relative size  0.403 100  0.097 144 0.306*** 0.00 
Unrelated deal (1/0)  0.296 206  0.420 205 -0.123*** 0.01 
Private target (1/0)  0.602 206  0.298 205 0.304*** 0.00 
Public target (1/0)  0.146 206  0.229 205 -0.084** 0.03 
Subsidiary target (1/0)  0.252 206  0.429 205 -0.177*** 0.00 
Both high tech (1/0)   0.340 206  0.137 205 0.203*** 0.00 
Panel B: GMI index 
  High index  Low index   
Variable   Mean N  Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return      
CAR (-2, +2) (%)  0.447 140  0.372 140 0.075 0.92 
         
Acquisition premiums         
Acquisition premium_4w (%)  53.263 12  29.560 9 23.703 0.25 
         
Deal characteristics         
All-cash deal (1/0)  0.271 140  0.207 140 0.064 0.21 
Stock deal (1/0)  0.114 140  0.121 140 -0.007 0.85 
Relative size  0.235 84  0.133 79 0.102 0.25 
Unrelated deal (1/0)  0.400 140  0.257 140 0.143** 0.01 
Private target (1/0)  0.471 140  0.414 140 0.057 0.34 
Public target (1/0)  0.164 140  0.207 140 -0.043 0.36 
Subsidiary target (1/0)  0.357 140  0.357 140 0.000 1.00 
Both high tech (1/0)   0.257 140  0.207 140 0.050 0.32 
Panel C: BSCI index 
  High index  Low index   
Variable   Mean N  Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return      
CAR (-2, +2) (%)  0.076 140  0.710 141 0.633 0.40 
         
Acquisition premiums         
Acquisition premium_4w (%)  53.740 11  31.406 10 -22.334 0.26 
         
Deal characteristics         
All-cash deal (1/0)  0.279 140  0.206 141 -0.073 0.15 
Stock deal (1/0)  0.114 140  0.128 141 0.013 0.73 
Relative size  0.251 89  0.105 76 -0.146 0.09 
Unrelated deal (1/0)  0.386 140  0.277 141 -0.109* 0.05 
Private target (1/0)  0.443 140  0.447 141 0.004 0.95 
Public target (1/0)  0.171 140  0.199 141 0.027 0.56 
Subsidiary target (1/0)  0.379 140  0.333 141 -0.045 0.43 
Both high tech (1/0)   0.264 140   0.199 141 -0.066 0.19 
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6.3.2 Multivariate analysis: Deal characteristics 
In this section, I conduct regression analysis to compare the explanatory power of D&O insurance 
premium on acquirer returns to GMI and BSCI governance indexes and test their relevance to work 
as a proxy for the corporate governance quality. Masulis et al. (2007) use two different corporate 
governance indexes and staggered board variable as proxies for the quality of corporate governance 
in their study of corporate governance and acquirer returns. In this study, I replace staggered board 
variable with a D&O insurance premium measure to compare its ability to explain CARs to corporate 
governance indexes. The main empirical model is: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑓(Proxy for governance quality, Deal characteristics, Time effects)   (10) 
In Eq. (10), the dependent variable is the acquirer’s five-day CAR (-2, +2) around acquisition 
announcement date. The independent variables are the D&O insurance premium variable and two 
corporate governance indexes: The natural logarithmic transformation of per dollar D&O insurance 
premium (Log(per dollar premium), Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI index), and Globe 
and Mail Governance Index (GMI index). The results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
of Eq. (10) are presented in Table 12, controlling for year dummies, and deal characteristics described 
in Section 5.2. Acquirer characteristics and deal types will be added to regression in the following 
section. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering.  
As can be seen from Table 12, higher D&O insurance premium has significant negative relation with 
CARs, suggesting that the D&O insurance premium includes valuable information for investors on 
the quality of corporate governance structures. More specifically, the point estimate in column (1) 
indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the natural logarithmic transformation of per dollar 
premium reduces CARs by 0.9%, suggesting that the results are both economically and statistically 
significant. On the other hand, both of the two corporate governance indexes have insignificant 
relation with the acquirer returns.    
For my control variables, all the three target types have moderate statistical significance in at least 
one of the regressions and they are in line with prior literature. Other control variables have 
insignificant effect on acquirer returns at this point.  
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Table 12: Regression of acquirer returns and governance quality: Deal characteristics 
This table presents results from OLS regressions of CAR (-2, +2) (%) on measures of corporate governance 
quality. The sample consists of 411 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) and cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) between 
2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance, corporate governance index, and stock price 
information. Log(Per dollar premium) is the natural logarithmic transformation of per dollar D&O insurance 
premium, and GMI and BSCI are corporate governance indexes. The regressions control for deal 
characteristics and year fixed-effects. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) are used in computing 
t-statistics [in brackets]. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
level (two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
within-firm serial correlation. The coefficients of the constant and year dummies are omitted for brevity. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Governance measures    
Log(per dollar premium) -0.400**   
 [2.490]   
GMI index  -0.013  
  [-0.510]  
BSCI index   -0.007 
   [-0.450] 
Deal characteristics    
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.600 0.400 0.400 
 [0.750] [0.300] [0.330] 
Stock deal (1/0) 1.600 2.800 2.700 
 [1.200] [1.240] [1.250] 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.100 -0.400 -0.500 
 [0.080] [-0.460] [-0.530] 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.300 2.600 2.600* 
 [0.350] [1.860] [1.910] 
Private target (1/0) 0.100 2.100* 2.000* 
 [0.070] [1.710] [1.660] 
Public target (1/0) -2.600* -0.800 -0.800 
 [-1.940] [-0.440] [-0.420] 
High tech (1/0) -0.200 0.400 0.300 
 [-0.180] [0.300] [0.240] 
    
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.023 0.018 0.018 
Number of observations 411 280 281 
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6.3.3 Multivariate analysis: Acquirer characteristics and deal types 
The results in the previous section suggest that there is a significant negative relation between D&O 
insurance premium and acquirer returns, and there is no significant relation between either of the two 
governance indexes and acquirer returns. In this section, I add acquirer characteristics and five deal 
types based on M&A currency and target ownership status from the acquisition classification scheme 
to the model. Now, the empirical model is as follows: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) 
(11) 
The results are presented in Table 13, columns (1), (3), and (5) covering deal and acquirer 
characteristics and columns (2), (4), and (6) adding deal types to the model. As can be seen from the 
columns (1) and (2), adding firm characteristics as control variables do not reduce the significance of 
D&O insurance premium variable in explaining acquirer returns. Also, the relation between the two 
corporate governance indexes and CARs remain insignificant. For the control variables, public target 
has significance in explaining CARs. However, it has negative effect in the D&O insurance premium 
regression and positive effect in both corporate governance indexes regressions. FCF has moderately 
significant positive relation and stock price run up has significant negative relation with CARs in 
corporate governance indexes regressions. Other control variables have insignificant effect on 
acquirer returns. 
Adding the acquisition classification scheme to the model does not change the results. The negative 
relation between D&O insurance premium and acquirer returns remain statistically significant with 
these new control variables in column (2), and the relation between the two corporate governance 
indexes and CARs remain insignificant in columns (4) and (6). The decomposition to different deal 
types yields to higher explanatory power of my model for all regressions. The adjusted-R2 for D&O 
insurance premium in column (1) is 1.1% and in column (2) it is 6.7%.  
For the control variables, there is significant positive relation between stock deals and acquirer returns 
in BSCI index regression in column (6), and the same relation is moderately significant in D&O 
insurance premium and GMI index regressions in columns (2) and (4).  Public target has a significant 
positive relation with the acquirer returns and the positive effect of FCF remains moderately 
significant in the regressions of corporate governance indexes. Furthermore, the negative relation 
between stock price run-up and CARs in the governance indexes regressions becomes now less 
significant. Other control variables are insignificant in explaining acquirer returns. 
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Table 13: Regression of acquirer returns and governance quality: Additional controls 
This table presents results from OLS regressions of CAR (-2, +2) (%) on measures of corporate governance quality. The 
sample consists of 361 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and cross-listed 
in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O 
insurance, corporate governance index, and stock price information. Log(Per dollar premium) is the natural logarithmic 
transformation of per dollar D&O insurance premium, and GMI and BSCI are corporate governance indexes. Regressions in 
columns (1), (3), and (5) control for deal and acquirer characteristics, and regressions in columns (2), (4), and (6) add deal 
types to the model. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) are used in computing t-statistics [in brackets]. *, **, ***: 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Standards errors are 
robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. The coefficients of the constant, and year 
dummies are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance measures       
Log(per dollar premium) -1.025** -1.045**     
 [2.170] [2.170]     
GMI index   -0.023 -0.026   
   [-0.730] [-0.800]   
BSCI index     -0.013 0.000 
     [-0.750] [-0.860] 
Deal characteristics       
All-cash deal (1/0) -0.009 -0.527 -0.589 0.218 -0.582 0.001 
 [-0.010] [-0.290] [-0.540] [0.100] [-0.540] [0.040] 
Stock deal (1/0) 1.402 8.622* 2.286 11.446* 2.017 0.112** 
 [0.980] [1.970] [0.960] [2.060] [0.870] [2.060] 
Unrelated deal (1/0) -0.433 -0.575 -0.669 -0.824 -0.702 -0.008 
 [-0.490] [-0.670] [-0.680] [-0.800] [-0.710] [-0.830] 
Subsidiary target (1/0) -0.057 -0.540 2.323 2.245 2.370 0.022 
 [-0.050] [-0.370] [1.650] [1.160] [1.750] [1.180] 
Private target (1/0) -0.182 -0.444 1.842 1.977 1.670 0.017 
 [-0.160] [-0.300] [1.530] [1.230] [1.450] [1.090] 
Public target (1/0) -2.669* 3.458 -0.072 6.541** -0.018 0.066** 
 [-1.810] [1.480] [-0.040] [2.040] [-0.010] [2.090] 
High tech (1/0) 0.293 0.266 0.706 0.627 0.458 0.004 
 [0.250] [0.230] [0.520] [0.470] [0.370] [0.340] 
Acquirer characteristics       
Leverage -0.002 -0.011 0.011 0.004 0.009 0.000 
 [-0.120] [-0.540] [0.480] [0.210] [0.380] [0.120] 
Log(assets) 0.688 0.836 -0.082 0.124 -0.124 0.001 
 [1.360] [1.660] [-0.350] [0.570] [-0.510] [0.310] 
FCF 1.210 1.001 1.455* 1.234* 1.468* 0.013* 
 [1.590] [1.460] [1.810] [1.710] [1.810] [1.710] 
Market-to-book 0.074 0.080 0.081 0.013 0.090 0.000 
 [0.980] [1.010] [0.620] [0.100] [0.670] [0.230] 
Stock price run-up (%) -0.947 -0.731 -1.673** -1.266* -1.669** -0.013* 
 [-1.230] [-0.960] [-2.320] [-1.600] [-2.310] [-1.700] 
Deal types       
Public target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0)  -15.108***  -18.041***  -0.181*** 
  [-3.140]  [-2.600]  [-2.740] 
Public target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0)  -5.505*  -6.069  -0.061 
  [-1.900]  [-1.500]  [-1.530] 
Private target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0)  -6.527  -7.399  -0.079 
  [-1.460]  [-1.200]  [-1.400] 
Private target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0)  1.897  0.229  0.005 
  [0.830]  [0.070]  [0.160] 
Subs. target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0)  0.057  -1.815  -0.016 
  [0.020]  [-0.600]  [-0.530] 
       
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.011 0.067 0.013 0.095 0.011 0.094 
Number of observations 361 361 252 252 253 253 
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6.3.4 Sensitivity test 
In this section, I follow Masulis et al. (2007) and conduct a sensitivity test to my results in previous 
sections. In other words, I use a dummy variable approach and classify acquirers as dictatorship 
versus democracy firms based on the three variables, respectively. Specifically, I define the dummy 
variables Dictatorship Log(per dollar premium), Dictatorship GMI index, and Dictatorship BSCI 
index to be equal to one for acquirers with an above-median values of each variable, and zero 
otherwise. I re-estimate the acquirer return regressions in Table 13 after replacing continuous 
variables with these new dummy variables, and report the coefficient estimates in Table 14. 
The results in column (1) of Table 14 show that acquirers in the dictatorship portfolio based on the 
D&O insurance premium experience significantly lower CARs than firms in the below median group. 
The results in columns (2) and (3) show that relations between dictatorship portfolios based on the 
two governance indexes and acquirer returns are not significant. The results in all three columns are 
in line with the results of previous regressions and support my findings. 
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Table 14: Dummy variables approach 
This table presents results from OLS regressions of CAR (-2, +2) (%) on dummy variables derived from measures of 
corporate governance quality. The sample consists of 361 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) and cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) between 2003 and 2013, 
subject to the availability of D&O insurance, corporate governance index, and stock price information. Firms with above-
median values of three governance variables are denoted as dictatorship firms: Dictatorship Log(per dollar premium), 
Dictatorship Globe and Mail Governance Index (GMI), and Dictatorship Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI). Based 
on the dictatorship classification, a dummy variable is defined to be equal to one for firms that are dictatorship firms, and 
zero otherwise. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) are used in computing t-statistics [in brackets]. *, **, ***: 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are 
robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. The coefficients of the constant, and year 
dummies are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Governance measures    
Dictatorship Log(per dollar premium) -2.395   
 [2.070]   
Dictatorship GMI index  -0.427  
  [-0.580]  
Dictatorship BSCI index   -0.723 
   [-1.040] 
Deal characteristics    
All-cash deal (1/0) -1.244 -0.695 -0.781 
 [-0.740] [-0.250] [-0.290] 
Stock deal (1/0) 8.415 5.711 5.675 
 [1.960] [1.620] [1.610] 
Unrelated deal (1/0) -0.369 -0.566 -0.518 
 [-0.460] [-0.700] [-0.650] 
Subsidiary target (1/0) -0.465 -1.009 -0.968 
 [-0.330] [-0.380] [-0.370] 
Private target (1/0) -0.839 -0.832 -0.857 
 [-0.550] [-0.330] [-0.340] 
Public target (1/0) 3.716 1.923 2.219 
 [1.650] [0.530] [0.620] 
High tech (1/0) 0.256 -0.077 -0.215 
 [0.210] [-0.080] [-0.240] 
Deal types    
Public target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0) -15.026 -10.584 -10.787 
 [-3.170] [-2.240] [-2.300] 
Public target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0) -5.095 -3.297 -3.396 
 [-1.830] [-0.840] [-0.870] 
Private target (1/0) x stock deal (1/0) -5.977 -3.170 -3.394 
 [-1.380] [-0.890] [-0.960] 
Private target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0) 2.770 0.458 0.710 
 [1.280] [0.150] [0.240] 
Subsidiary target (1/0) x all-cash deal (1/0) 0.617 -0.576 -0.309 
 [0.280] [-0.190] [-0.100] 
Acquirer characteristics    
Leverage -0.009 0.002 0.003 
 [-0.510] [0.130] [0.170] 
Log(assets) 0.305 -0.029 -0.053 
 [1.040] [-0.150] [-0.270] 
FCF 1.322 0.328 0.299 
 [1.750] [0.450] [0.410] 
Market-to-book -0.014 -0.106 -0.092 
 [-0.150] [-0.940] [-0.860] 
Stock price run-up (%) -0.575 -1.138 -1.105 
 [-0.780] [-1.770] [-1.730] 
    
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.061 0.020 0.025 
Number of observations 361 253 252 
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7. Discussion of results 
In this section, I link the results of my analysis in Section 6. to the theoretical literature in Section 2. 
I provide my research questions and a brief overview of my results in Table 15 and discuss their 
implications both to the academic literature as well as to the investing public. I discuss D&O 
insurance information disclosure in regulators perspective and economic implications of my results. 
Table 15: Summary of empirical findings 
Original research question Empirical finding 
1. Is there a difference in the amount of 
D&O insurance coverage between 
firms listed only in Canada and firms 
cross-listed in the US? 
Firms that are cross-listed are more likely to buy D&O insurance 
protection and they carry higher coverage limits. 
2. Is there a difference in M&A activity 
of firms with low and high D&O 
insurance coverage between cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed firms? 
The indirect evidence of this study suggests that cross-listed firms 
with low D&O insurance coverage make relatively fewer 
acquisitions than non-cross-listed firms with low coverage. 
Reduced M&A activity among cross-listed firms with low 
coverage can be an indication of an underinvestment problem. 
3. Is there a difference in the impact of 
D&O insurance coverage on acquirer 
returns between non-cross-listed firms 
and firms cross-listed in the US? 
Firms listed only in Canada experience negative acquirer returns 
and firms cross-listed in the US experience positive acquirer 
returns when their D&O insurance coverage increases. 
4. Can D&O insurance premium 
explain acquirer returns and thus be 
used as a proxy for the quality of 
corporate governance? 
D&O insurance premium has a significant negative relation with 
acquirer returns. 
5. Which one of the variables, D&O 
insurance premium or the two 
governance indexes, has the strongest 
explanatory power of acquirer returns? 
D&O insurance premium has the strongest explanatory power. 
The two benchmark governance indexes do not have significant 
relation with acquirer returns. 
7.1 Legal implications 
Regulators in many countries (e.g. the US, Finland, and Germany) do not require publicly listed firms 
to disclose their D&O insurance information. However, it is really common that firms are required to 
provide detailed information on other governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics, CEO 
experience and antitakeover provisions (ATPs). My results support recent studies that show the value 
54 
 
of D&O insurance information for outside investors in assessing risks related to governance structures 
of a firm. There is a lot of evidence that the amount of D&O insurance coverage a firm purchases 
affects the behavior of its management team. Furthermore, there is evidence that D&O insurance 
premium includes information that is not otherwise available in the market, and that it can be used as 
a better proxy for the quality of corporate governance than other measures available at the moment. 
Therefore, my results have important policy implications in countries that do not require D&O 
insurance information disclosure. They are particularly important in the US, since my results take 
into account firms that are listed in there. My study provides empirical support for requiring firms to 
disclose their D&O insurance information, which Baker and Griffith (2007) have advocated for using 
qualitative evidence from extensive interviews and surveys, and Kang and Klausner (2011) by 
studying the relation between D&O insurance information and CEO overcompensation. Thus, as 
D&O insurance information signals the behavior of the management team and the quality of a firm’s 
governance, it is logical to ask why this signal is not already being sent. Baker and Griffith (2007) 
suggest three possible reasons: Comparative information, free-riding and first mover disadvantage, 
and fear of attracting nuisance suits are the main concerns hindering the disclosure of D&O details. 
First, they point out that the value of D&O policy information is purely comparative. Relevance of a 
firm’s D&O insurance premium and payout limits emerges only upon comparison with similar firms. 
For example, by taking a broad industry-wise sample and controlling for variables such as market 
capitalization and volatility. My results support Kang and Klausner (2011) by showing that per dollar 
premium serves as a decent substitute for the quality of governance structure.  
Second reason is that D&O insurance information could not be disclosed since each of the firms 
within an industry is disinclined to produce the information because of free rider effects.  Investors 
of other firms cannot be charged for the information which is largely of value to them. Firms can also 
fear backlash from disclosing D&O details. When not placed in context, large amounts of D&O 
insurance expenses do not reflect well on the firm’s management. 
Finally and most importantly, firms fear that mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance details will 
encourage plaintiffs to file non-meritorious suits and seek to reach insurance assets. The possibility 
of these suits is the most common objection against the mandatory disclosure. However, according 
to Kang and Klausner (2011), it is unlikely that disclosure will change the dynamics of shareholder 
litigation. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are well aware that average limits for firms with assets in excess of $100 
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million are in tens of millions of dollars and can estimate a firm’s coverage within a fairly accurate 
range. Therefore, disclosure of details would not add anything substantial to lawyers’ arsenals. 
However, countries where D&O insurance information disclosure is now mandatory, such as Canada 
and the United Kingdom, overcame these same issues. The results of my study show a negative 
relation between D&O insurance coverage and acquirer returns for firms listed only in Canada, and 
a positive relation for firms cross-listed in the US. My study also shows a negative relation between 
D&O insurance premiums and quality of corporate governance. Thus, the opposite results relating to 
the D&O coverage in different markets and the unique information relating to the D&O insurance 
premium makes this a rich area for future research. Overall, a growing consensus inside and outside 
academia indicates that weak governance is costly to outside shareholders. This study shows that 
D&O insurance can be a valuable source of information, henceforth unavailable or unknown to the 
general investing public, to mitigate some of the costs associated with weak governance and to 
understand the effect of D&O insurance on the behavior of firm directors. 
7.2 Economic implications of my research 
The results of this study are valuable to both the investing public and firms themselves in their 
insurance purchases. First, I will discuss economic implications of the D&O insurance coverage 
results and then economic implications of the D&O insurance premium results. 
7.2.1 Economic implications of D&O insurance coverage 
My results show that firms listed only in Canadian stock market experience lower acquirer returns 
when they purchase higher D&O insurance coverage, which is in line with Lin et al. (2011). These 
results are consistent with the argument that D&O insurance in Canadian market induces unintended 
moral hazard on the part of directors and officers by shielding them from discipline of shareholder 
litigation. According to Lin et al. (2011), entrenched or poorly governed directors who are protected 
from shareholder discipline make poor decision about major corporate investments. They can pursue 
their own interest by adopting low-risk, self-serving operating strategies, which coincidentally 
redound to the benefit of firm bondholders. Also, according to Lin et al. (2013), in Canada lenders 
view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk and higher levels of D&O insurance coverage 
are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to 
aggressive financial reporting. 
However, my results are opposite for firms that are cross-listed in the US. Cross-listed firms that 
purchase higher D&O insurance coverage experience higher CARs than the ones with lower 
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coverage. It is therefore possible that higher D&O insurance protection can lead to more optimal risk-
taking and board efficiency, when a firm is operating under US legislation and market environment. 
Thus, D&O insurance can work as an efficient contract between shareholders and directors. As my 
univariate results show, cross-listing itself cannot explain acquirer returns. However, it does have an 
effect on some acquirer and deal characteristics, but they cannot explain why cross-listed firms, 
opposite to non-cross-listed firms, experience higher CARs when their D&O insurance protection 
increases.  
Possible explanations for the positive relation between D&O insurance coverage and acquirer returns 
of cross-listed firms can be looked from acquirer and deal characteristics between cross-listed firms 
that have high or low D&O insurance coverages. My results are mixed, since some of the 
characteristics related to high coverage are known to improve acquirer returns and some of them are 
known to reduce them. Furthermore, the mean market-to-book ratio of low coverage firms is 
significantly higher than the one of high coverage firms, meaning that their valuations are higher in 
the market. If low coverage firms would use more stock financing in their acquisitions, it could 
explain their lower CARs as they could be trying to benefit from their overvalued stock at the expense 
of shareholders. However, that is not the case in my results.  
One possible explanation for the opposite results can be the differences between market 
characteristics of the US and Canada. The legal environment is more litigious in the US and thus low 
or inexistent D&O insurance protection puts directors and officers under higher personal legal risk in 
the US than it does in Canada. While class-action securities suits are common in the US, only very 
few have been brought in Canada so far. As Priest (1987) points out, more litigious legal environment 
in the US can increase the importance of D&O insurance in attracting higher quality risk-averse 
outside directors. Furthermore, cross-listed firms receive more analyst coverage, which means that 
the decisions directors make are more under the scope and their possibilities to make self-serving 
actions can be more difficult. Holderness (1990) state that D&O insurance could work better as a 
substitute for direct shareholder monitoring by relying on the insurer’s screening mechanisms. It is 
possible that the screening mechanisms are more effective in the US than in Canada. Therefore, low 
D&O insurance protection can affect the behavior of directors and officers more in the US than it 
does in Canada. According to Boyer and Tennyson (2011), high liability exposure can cause an under-
investment problem for firms with low D&O insurance coverage by inducing directors to be overly 
conservative and can cause them to forgo risky positive-NPV projects. If that was true, D&O 
insurance coverage can enhance board efficiency in the US rather than cause unintended moral hazard 
as it appears to do in Canada. The indirect evidence of M&A activity support the idea, but more 
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research is needed to find out whether it is the main source of the opposite results between cross-
listed and non-cross-listed firms. 
7.2.2 Economic implications of D&O insurance premium 
My results suggest that D&O insurance premium contains information useful to investors. Also, my 
results suggest that the two most commonly used Canadian corporate governance indexes cannot 
explain acquirer returns. The direct evidence of Kang and Klausner (2011) suggest that US 
shareholders would find the independent assessment contained in D&O insurance premiums to be a 
useful summary of the likelihood of litigation associated with governance structures. Furthermore, 
their indirect evidence suggest that these same shareholders could use D&O insurance premium 
information as an additional tool for assessing the relative effectiveness of governance structures in 
maximizing shareholder returns. My study supports their results, as I find statistically significant 
negative relation between per dollar D&O insurance premium and acquirer returns. My results 
support the idea that firms fail to continually optimize their corporate governance, and firms with 
worse corporate governance pay more for their D&O insurance than firms with better governance. 
Therefore, investors can use D&O pricing as an accurate proxy to evaluate the quality of a firm’s 
corporate governance. 
Furthermore, when comparing the per dollar premium variable to two most commonly used Canadian 
corporate governance indexes, my results suggest that it has higher explanatory power of acquirer 
returns. Overall, either GMI or BSCI governance index does not have statistically significant relation 
with acquirer returns. This raises at least two questions: First, how is it possible that D&O insurance 
premium includes information that is not already available in the markets and not included in 
governance indexes? Second, why do governance indexes fail in doing what they are developed for? 
The possible answer to the first question comes from the D&O insurance pricing process. 
Underwriters of insurance companies price D&O policies according to the risk posed by each 
prospective insured. However, in addition to performing only a basic financial analysis of the firm, 
underwriters focus a large part of their efforts on deep governance variables such as culture and 
character. These deep governance variables are not included in corporate governance indexes, and it 
is possible that they play an important part in evaluation of the quality of corporate governance. My 
findings support the idea that D&O insurance premium includes unique information on governance 
structures. 
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Second, why do corporate governance indexes fail? According to Klausner (2013), the meaning for 
governance indexes is that they try to measure the degree to which management is vulnerable to being 
replaced by shareholder action. Therefore, the elements of the indexes are seen as potential causes of 
management entrenchment. However, many elements of the indexes cannot cause entrenchment, and 
others that can cause entrenchment do so only under limited circumstances. As a result, each non-
causal element in the index introduces a hook of spurious correlation or correlation with no potential 
causation.  
Furthermore, Klausner (2013) suggests two related weaknesses in governance indexes. First, he 
mentions that they give equal weight to elements that have unequal impacts on entrenchment. It 
reflects a reasonable judgment that a degree of inaccuracy is a cost worth bearing for the virtue of 
tractability. However, indexes should not include elements that have a very low or highly contingent 
impact. Second, a related but more serious weakness is that they include many such elements. 
Specifically, indexes include elements that are problematic in the following ways: First, they have no 
impact on management entrenchment. Second, indexes have no impact on entrenchment if a firm has 
an effective staggered board. Third, they have an impact on entrenchment only under limited 
circumstances. Finally, indexes have no relevance to entrenchment and in fact no proven beneficial 
impacts on governance. In conclusion, problems with the structures and the lack of relevant 
information are probable reasons why governance indexes do not work well as proxies for the quality 
of corporate governance.   
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8. Conclusions 
D&O insurance is common in North America, and especially valuable for the management teams of 
firms operating in the US where the legal environment is very litigious. It has become an important 
layer of protection for firm directors and officers against personal legal liabilities they can face 
because of the decisions they make on behalf of the firm. The empirical research on the effects of 
D&O insurance on the incentives of directors and officers, and the relation between D&O insurance 
premium and firm’s governance structures have recently increased. However, the effects of the 
insurance on firms operating in the US are still under the shade due to the fact that D&O insurance 
information is not publicly available there. 
My study sheds light on the effects of D&O insurance in the US by examining the relation between 
D&O insurance variables and acquirer returns with Canadian sample firms cross-listed in the US. 
First, I find that cross-listed firms are more likely to purchase D&O insurance and they carry higher 
coverage limits than firms listed only in Canada. Second, I find a significant negative relation between 
D&O insurance coverage and acquirer returns for firms listed only in Canada. The negative relation 
is in line with the prior literature. However, the relation becomes significantly positive when a firm 
is cross-listed in the US. The positive relation between D&O insurance coverage and acquirer returns 
of cross-listed firms mean that shareholders of those firms can benefit from the extensive D&O 
insurance protection. Third, I find that D&O insurance premium can be used as a proxy for the quality 
of corporate governance and that higher D&O insurance premium has a significant negative relation 
with acquirer returns. Finally, I find that D&O insurance premium has higher explanatory power of 
acquirer returns than two most commonly used Canadian corporate governance indexes. The higher 
explanatory power of D&O insurance premium indicates that it includes valuable information on 
governance structures that is not otherwise publicly available. 
My results suggest that the effect of D&O insurance coverage on acquirer returns can vary between 
different markets. The negative relation among firms listed only in Canada indicates that D&O 
insurance can induce unintended moral hazard in firm managements by shielding them from the 
discipline of litigation. If that was the case, it is possible that entrenched or poorly governed directors 
who are protected from shareholder discipline make poor decisions about major corporate 
investments. On the other hand, the positive relation among cross-listed firms indicates that D&O 
insurance can lead to more optimal risk-taking and board efficiency. However, the indirect evidence 
of my study suggest that M&A activity of cross-listed firms with low D&O insurance protection can 
be affected by the more litigious US legislation. Hence, the positive relation between acquirer returns 
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and D&O insurance coverage among cross-listed firms with low coverage can be a result of an 
under-investment problem.  
The fact that D&O insurance can have opposite effects on acquirer returns in different market areas 
leaves room for future research. The possibility to use cross-listing helps to study market areas that 
have been out of reach due to limitations on the availability of D&O insurance information. 
Furthermore, cross-listing approach provides various ways to study the effects of D&O insurance on 
firms operating in the US. For example, the relation between D&O insurance and firm risk taking and 
loan spreads would be an interesting research topic.  
Free-riding, first mover disadvantage, and fear of attracting nuisance suits are the main concerns hindering 
the disclosure of D&O details. However, countries where the disclosure is mandatory overcame these 
issues. Generally, my study supports the idea that D&O insurance information is valuable for outside 
investors in assessing the quality of corporate governance structures, and that legislators around the 
world should consider requiring the disclosure of this piece of information. 
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APPENDIX A. Variable definitions 
Table 16: Variable definitions 
  
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Panel A: Insurance and corporate governance index information 
Insurance (1/0) Equals one if a firm has purchased D&O insurance; zero otherwise 
Insurance coverage 
The coverage limit of the D&O insurance policy in millions of 
Canadian dollars (C$mm) 
Insurance coverage ratio 
Personal coverage limit of the D&O insurance policy scaled by the 
firm’s average market value of equity in a year 
Insurance premium Annual D&O insurance premium in Canadian dollars (C$) 
Per dollar premium 
Total annual insurance premium/(effective coverage limit) x (market 
capitalization) 
BSCI index 
Academic corporate governance index evaluating the quality of firms 
governance structures 
GMI index 
Commercial corporate governance index evaluating the quality of 
firms governance structures 
Panel B: Acquisition outcomes 
CAR (-2, +2) (%) 
Five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market model 
estimated over the period [-210,-11] relative to the acquisition 
announcement date (day 0) 
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 
[(Offer price/target stock price 4 weeks prior to announcement)-1] x 
100 
Panel C: Deal characteristics 
Private target (1/0) Equals one when the target is a private firm; zero otherwise 
Subsidiary target (1/0) Equals one when the target is a subsidiary; zero otherwise 
All-cash deal (1/0) Equals one for deals financed only by cash; zero otherwise 
Stock deal (1/0) 
Equals one for deals that are at least partially financed by stock; zero 
otherwise 
Friendly deal (1/0) 
Equals one for deals that are listed as friendly in SDC database; zero 
for hostile takeovers 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 
Equals one for deals in which the acquirer and the target do not have 
the same two-digit SIC industry code; zero otherwise 
High tech (1/0) 
Equals one if the acquirer and target are both from high tech 
industries defined Loughran and Ritter (2004); zero otherwise 
Relative deal size Deal value (from SDC) over acquirer market value of equity 
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Panel D: Acquirer characteristics 
Cross-listed (1/0) 
Equals one for firms that are cross-listed in Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) and one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq); 
zero for firms listed only in TSX 
Log(assets) 
Natural log of book value of total assets in the fiscal year prior to 
acquisition announcement 
Market-to-book 
(Fiscal-year-end market value of equity + book value of 
liabilities)/total assets in the fiscal year prior to acquisition 
announcement, winsorized at the 1st/99th percentiles 
Leverage 
(Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/(fiscal-year end market 
value of equity + book value of liabilities) in the fiscal year prior to 
acquisition announcement 
Tobin's q Market value of assets over book value of assets 
FCF 
Free cash flow: (Operating income before depreciation - interest 
expense - income taxes - capital expenditure)/book value of total 
assets in the fiscal year prior to announcement, winsorized at the 
1st/99th percentiles 
Stock price run-up (%)  
Acquirer's buy-and-hold return during the [-210,-11] window minus 
the buy-and-hold return for the TSE 300 Index over the same period 
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APPENDIX B. Acquisitions by announcement year  
Table 17: Acquisitions by announcement year: Total sample 
The sample consists of 2,238 completed acquisitions made by firms that were listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange 
between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information. The numbers in 
parentheses are medians. C$mm is millions of Canadian dollars. Absolute dollar values are expressed in real terms 
(2003 Canadian dollars) and calculated using the Bank of Canada inflation calculator. Relative size is defined in 
Appendix A. 
Year No. Of Percentage Mean acquirer Mean deal value Mean relative deal size 
 acquisitions of sample market value of equity [Median] [Median] 
   [C$mm] [Median]   
2003 126 5.6 1,467 103 0.34 
   [491] [21] [0.05] 
2004 163 7.3 1,213 178 0.66 
   [280] [47] [0.11] 
2005 203 9.1 1,363 174 0.45 
   [384] [24] [0.09] 
2006 199 8.9 1,722 235 0.84 
   [406] [25] [0.10] 
2007 256 11.4 2,034 203 0.32 
   [406] [24] [0.09] 
2008 225 10.1 3,450 188 0.52 
   [421] [29] [0.05] 
2009 203 9.1 3,914 211 0.32 
   [554] [36] [0.08] 
2010 233 10.4 2,520 151 0.82 
   [316] [37] [0.12] 
2011 238 10.6 2,306 139 1.07 
   [436] [50] [0.11] 
2012 185 8.3 3,611 267 0.32 
   [763] [69] [0.09] 
2013 207 9.2 1,838 177 0.31 
   [501] [28] [0.08] 
Total 2238 100.0 2,358 186 0.54 
    [463] [38] [0.09] 
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APPENDIX C. Summary statistics 
Table 18: Summary statistics: Total sample 
This table presents univariate statistics for 2,338 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information, 
and the existence of the insurance. The table reports averages of acquirer abnormal announcement returns, acquisitions 
premiums, and deal and acquirer characteristics for subsamples based on cross-listing status. p-values are from two-
tailed t-tests. *,**,***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
      Percentiles   
Variable Mean Std. dev 25th 50th 75th N 
D&O insurance variable       
Insurance (1/0) 0.717 0.451 0.000 1.000 1.000 2238 
Insurance coverage (C$mm) 32.457 51.503 0.000 20.000 40.000 2048 
Insurance coverage ratio 0.106 0.799 0.000 0.020 0.076 2001 
       
Acquirer return    
CAR (-2,+2) (%) 0.686 7.318 -2.438 0.248 3.265 2238 
       
Acquisition premiums       
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 38.635 59.903 14.860 31.300 52.940 249 
       
Deal characteristics       
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.181 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 2238 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.209 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 2238 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.983 0.129 1.000 1.000 1.000 2238 
Relative size 0.545 2.109 0.026 0.088 0.304 1461 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.380 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 2238 
Private target (1/0) 0.508 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 2238 
Public target (1/0) 0.143 0.350 0.000 0.000 0.000 2238 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.329 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 2238 
High tech (1/0) 0.126 0.331 0.000 0.000 0.000 2238 
       
Acquirer characteristics       
Log(assets) 13.356 2.032 12.219 13.341 14.585 2186 
Market-to-book 1.758 4.373 0.860 1.490 2.210 2069 
Leverage 29.204 25.222 4.315 27.350 47.970 2216 
Tobin's q 1.803 1.832 1.115 1.391 1.907 2170 
Stock price run-up (%) 0.047 0.433 -0.169 0.008 0.191 2238 
Free cash flow -0.030 0.237 -0.074 0.020 0.075 2043 
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APPENDIX D. Univariate analysis: Insurance indicator 
 Table 19: Univariate analysis of D&O insurance purchase  
This table presents univariate statistics for 2,238 completed acquisitions made by firms listed in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) between 2003 and 2013, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information. The 
table reports averages of acquirer abnormal announcement returns, acquisitions premiums, and deal and acquirer 
characteristics for subsamples based on the insurance purchase decision. Firms that are listed only in TSX are the non-
cross-listed group (Panel B) and firms that are cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq) 
are the cross-listed group (Panel A). p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. *,**,***: statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Cross-listed firms 
 Firms  without D&O insurance  Firms with D&O insurance   
Variable  Mean N  Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return      
CAR (-2,+2) (%)  0.303 105  0.616 531 -0.314 0.67 
         
Acquisition premiums         
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 26.260 22  50.930 60 -24.670* 0.06 
         
Deal characteristics         
All-cash deal (1/0)  0.190 105  0.220 531 -0.030 0.48 
Stock deal (1/0)  0.238 105  0.168 531 0.070 0.12 
Relative size  0.283 73  0.249 315 0.034 0.70 
Unrelated deal (1/0)  0.200 105  0.328 531 -0.128*** 0.00 
Private target (1/0)  0.419 105  0.444 531 -0.025 0.63 
Public target (1/0)  0.124 105  0.205 531 -0.081** 0.03 
Subsidiary target (1/0)  0.419 105  0.331 531 0.088* 0.10 
High tech (1/0)   0.219 105  0.209 531 0.010 0.82 
Panel B: Non-cross-listed firms 
 Firms  without D&O insurance  Firms with D&O 
insurance 
  
Variable  Mean N  Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer return      
CAR (-2,+2) (%)  1.169 529  0.521 1073 0.649 0.13 
         
Acquisition premiums         
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 37.018 74  34.916 93 2.101 0.77 
         
Deal characteristics         
All-cash deal (1/0)  0.136 529  0.184 1073 -0.047*** 0.01 
Stock deal (1/0)  0.314 529  0.174 1073 0.140*** 0.00 
Relative size  0.909 376  0.416 696 0.492*** 0.00 
Unrelated deal (1/0)  0.287 529  0.470 1073 -0.182*** 0.00 
Private target (1/0)  0.478 529  0.562 1073 -0.084*** 0.00 
Public target (1/0)  0.170 529  0.101 1073 0.069*** 0.00 
Subsidiary target (1/0)  0.325 529  0.321 1073 0.005 0.86 
High tech (1/0)   0.057 529  0.109 1073 -0.052*** 0.00 
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APPENDIX E. Industry compositions 
Figure 3: Industry composition of cross-listed acquirers 
Figure 3 presents industry composition for cross-listed acquirers included in the study based on 12 Fama-French industry 
groups. The sample consists of 454 completed acquisitions made by firms that are listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange 
and cross-listed in one of the US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq). See French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data\ library.html) for industry definitions. 
 
Figure 4: Industry composition of non-cross-listed acquirers 
Figure 4 presents industry composition for non-cross-listed acquirers included in the study based on 12 Fama-French 
industry groups. The sample consists of 914 completed acquisitions made by firms that are listed in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange. See French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data\ library.html) for industry 
definitions. 
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